410 F.Supp.3d 1284
N.D. Fla.2019Background
- Amendment 4 (effective Jan. 8, 2019) restores voting rights to felons "upon completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation." Florida enacted SB7066 interpreting "all terms" to include fines, restitution, court-ordered fees, and amounts converted to civil liens.
- Plaintiffs: 17 individuals (who completed incarceration and supervision but have unpaid financial obligations; most allege inability to pay) and three organizations (NAACP state conference, Orange County NAACP, League of Women Voters of Florida).
- Plaintiffs challenge conditioning reenfranchisement on payment of financial obligations under the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection and Due Process), and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and also challenge Florida’s implementation/recordkeeping as constitutionally flawed.
- Defendants: Florida Secretary of State, Governor, and several county Supervisors of Elections; Secretary moved to dismiss/abstain; plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction.
- The district court denied abstention, assumed (for now) SB7066’s reading (that "all terms" includes financial obligations), found plaintiffs likely to succeed on the claim that inability to pay cannot bar reenfranchisement (controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent), and entered a limited preliminary injunction protecting named plaintiffs who show genuine inability to pay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing / redressability | Plaintiffs say injunction preventing enforcement of payment requirement as to those unable to pay will redress injury. | Secretary: plaintiffs attack only SB7066; if Amendment 4 independently requires payment, federal relief won’t help. | Court: plaintiffs’ claims (esp. as-applied) are redressable; motion to dismiss denied. |
| Abstention (Pullman etc.) | Plaintiffs urge federal resolution to avoid election-delay. | Secretary urges abstention pending Florida Supreme Court’s state-law interpretation. | Court denied abstention given voting-rights urgency and predictable state-law outcome for key issues. |
| Construction of "all terms of sentence" (fines, restitution, fees, liens) | Plaintiffs: phrase should be read to exclude non-punitive fees and not condition reenfranchisement on ability to pay. | Secretary: SB7066 reasonably interprets "all terms" to include all financial obligations in sentencing documents, including liens. | Court: leaves final interpretation to FL Supreme Court but, for now, assumes SB7066’s broad reading (includes fines, restitution, fees, liens) for purposes of the injunction. |
| Conditioning reenfranchisement on payment when unable to pay (constitutional claim) | Plaintiffs: access to franchise cannot depend on wealth or inability to pay; violates Equal Protection, Twenty-Fourth, and Due Process. | Secretary: state may rationally condition restoration on completion of sentence (including payment); deferential review applies. | Court: under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent (Johnson), the State cannot deny restoration solely because a person cannot afford to pay; plaintiffs likely to succeed on this as-applied claim. |
| Twenty-Fourth Amendment (poll tax/other tax) | Plaintiffs argue conditioning on certain fees may function as a tax and thus violate the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. | Secretary: these are sentence-based obligations, not poll taxes; many are fines/restitution or regulatory fees. | Court: acknowledged complexity; fines/restitution likely not "taxes," but some fees could functionally be taxes—declined to decide now because it does not affect preliminary relief for named plaintiffs. |
| Due process / vagueness / implementation | Plaintiffs: Florida’s decentralized, inconsistent records and new attestations threaten wrongful prosecutions and deny meaningful process. | Secretary: procedural safeguards exist (Supervisor hearings, de novo circuit-court review); workgroup and forms can fix defects. | Court: due-process safeguards (hearing before Supervisor, de novo judicial review) are constitutionally adequate here; SB7066 not facially void for vagueness; but administrative deficiencies could prompt renewed relief if they force eligible voters to risk prosecution. |
| Remedy scope | Plaintiffs seek immediate registration/voting for named individuals. | Secretary: State may use available processes (including Executive Clemency Board) to address inability-to-pay claims. | Court: injunction does not automatically register/name allow voting; it bars preventing application or voting based solely on failure to pay when plaintiff shows genuine inability to pay, and requires a process to establish that inability. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (state officers suit for prospective injunctive relief) (establishes exception to sovereign immunity for suits against state officers)
- Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (states may disenfranchise felons under Fourteenth Amendment apportionment clause)
- Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. en banc) (access to the franchise cannot depend on an individual’s financial resources; State must allow relief for those genuinely unable to pay)
- Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (wealth is irrelevant to voter qualifications)
- M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (equal-protection indigency rules have exceptions for voting and criminal-process contexts)
- Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (defendants cannot be punished for inability to pay; inability-to-pay protections in criminal settings)
- Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, 312 U.S. 496 (Pullman abstention doctrine) (federal courts may abstain to allow state-law clarification)
- Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (declining Pullman abstention where voting-rights immediacy counsels federal resolution)
- National Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (functional approach to determining whether an exaction is a tax)