Jones v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 29

Background

In 2000 Donte Lamar Jones (then under 18) participated in an armed robbery; after fleeing he shot a clerk who died. He later entered an Alford plea to capital murder and stipulated to a life sentence without parole as part of a plea agreement, waiving appeals.
The trial court imposed life without parole on the capital murder count and concurrent term-of-years sentences; Jones served ~12 years and then filed a motion to vacate his life sentence under Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana.
Virginia courts (in Jones I) held Code § 19.2-303 gives trial courts authority to suspend life sentences, so Virginia’s sentencing scheme was not a “mandatory” life-without-parole regimen for Miller purposes.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted cert, vacated, and remanded in light of Montgomery; the Virginia Supreme Court reconsidered whether Miller/Montgomery require relief despite Jones’s plea, waiver, and failure to request mitigation or a hearing at sentencing.
The Court reaffirmed Jones I and affirmed denial of the motion to vacate, holding that (1) Virginia law permits suspension of life sentences and thus the sentence was not the type of “mandatory” scheme Miller condemned, and (2) Jones waived Miller-based relief by stipulating to the life-without-parole sentence and failing to present mitigation; a collateral challenge via a late trial-court motion to vacate is not the proper vehicle for a Miller claim that is otherwise addressable on direct appeal or habeas.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Jones)	Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth)	Held
Whether Jones’s life sentence was a "mandatory" LWOP in Miller sense	Virginia’s statutory authorization of only LWOP for capital murder makes Jones’s LWOP effectively mandatory	Virginia law (Code §19.2-303) authorizes suspension of life sentences; sentencing was not mandatory	Court: Not mandatory — Virginia sentencing law permits suspension; Miller inapplicable on that ground (reaffirms Jones I)
Whether Montgomery/Miller require a sentencing (Miller) hearing even where sentence was discretionary or imposed by plea	Miller/Montgomery require individualized Miller-style consideration before any juvenile can be sentenced to LWOP; hearing required even for discretionary schemes	Miller/Montgomery target mandatory schemes that preclude consideration; Virginia affords opportunity to present mitigation; no constitutional hearing mandate in this context	Court: Montgomery/Miller address mandatory schemes; because Virginia law allowed mitigation/suspension, Jones was not denied the required opportunity
Whether Jones waived Miller relief by stipulating to LWOP and waiving appeals	A plea/waiver cannot extinguish a substantive constitutional right; an unconstitutionally imposed LWOP is void ab initio so waiver is ineffective	A defendant may knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently waive appeal and related claims; Jones expressly waived and also failed to seek mitigation	Court: Waiver principles apply; Jones waived Miller claim by stipulation and failure to request mitigation; traditional waiver/forfeiture rules are dispositive
Proper procedural vehicle and effect of Miller violation (void vs voidable)	A Miller violation renders LWOP void ab initio, so a late motion to vacate is a proper remedy and relief must follow	Sentences violating Miller are voidable, not necessarily void ab initio; state law governs collateral procedures — Miller claims must be pursued on direct appeal or habeas; a late motion to vacate is not the correct vehicle	Court: Miller violations do not automatically render sentence void ab initio for purposes of a late trial-court motion; remedying Miller claims depends on state collateral-review law (direct appeal or habeas) and Jones’s motion was properly denied

Key Cases Cited

Jones v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 475 (Va. 2014) (initial Virginia Supreme Court decision holding Virginia scheme non-mandatory and Miller inapplicable)
Rawls v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 213 (Va. 2009) (sentence outside statutory range is void ab initio; bright-line rule)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory juvenile LWOP unconstitutional because it precludes consideration of youth and mitigating circumstances)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule to be applied retroactively and requires that juveniles be afforded opportunity for parole consideration or resentencing)
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880) (historic principle that convictions under unconstitutional laws warrant habeas relief)
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982) (discussion of retroactivity and when prior judgments may be treated as void)