Jones v. Barnhart
2:10-cv-12114
| E.D. Mich. | Jun 8, 2017Background
- John W. Jones, a prisoner-plaintiff, sued multiple defendants and was allowed to file an amended complaint; Defendant Patricia Barnhart (former acting warden) repeatedly moved for summary judgment over the course of the case.
- Barnhart’s fourth motion for summary judgment (Feb. 13, 2017) argued statute of limitations, failure to exhaust administrative remedies (PLRA), qualified immunity, and no individual ADA liability.
- Plaintiff moved to strike Barnhart’s answer as untimely under 42 U.S.C. §1997e(g) (PLRA) and sought deeming allegations admitted; Magistrate Judge Patti denied that motion, construing “reply” in §1997e(g) to mean an answer only.
- Magistrate Judge Patti issued a Report & Recommendation (R&R) recommending grant of Barnhart’s summary judgment motion, dismissing the case for failure to exhaust and qualified immunity.
- Plaintiff objected to the Magistrate’s order and the R&R, arguing “reply” under §1997e(g) should include dispositive motions (so Barnhart waived defenses by not timely answering). The district court overruled the objections, adopted the R&R, granted Barnhart’s summary judgment, and dismissed the case in its entirety.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of “reply” in 42 U.S.C. §1997e(g) | “Reply” should include answer, motion to dismiss, or motion for summary judgment; legislative history and rules support broader meaning | “Reply” should be read as an answer only; PLRA creates an exception to ordinary pleading rules so a dispositive motion does not waive the right to later answer | Court: “reply” may be construed to encompass an answer only; Magistrate’s narrow construction not clearly erroneous or contrary to law |
| Whether Barnhart waived affirmative defenses (exhaustion, qualified immunity) by not timely answering | Waiver occurred because defendant did not timely file an answer and thus lost defenses | No waiver; PLRA’s waiver provision does not operate to nullify defendants’ ability to file dispositive motions or preserve defenses | Court: No waiver; defenses were preserved; R&R adopted |
| Appropriateness of striking Barnhart’s answer and deeming allegations admitted | Strike answer and take allegations as admitted under PLRA and Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 consequences | Deny strike; rule and precedent support allowing answer even if filed after dispositive motions under PLRA | Court: Denied; Magistrate’s order to deny strike was upheld |
| Grant of summary judgment on exhaustion and qualified immunity | N/A (relies on preserved defenses) | Summary judgment warranted based on failure to exhaust and qualified immunity | Court: Granted Barnhart’s motion for summary judgment; dismissed case |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. City of Bessemer, N.C., 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (clearly erroneous standard for review of factual findings)
- United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) (defining the “clearly erroneous” standard)
- United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000) (statutory-exception interpretation: courts should not create exceptions beyond those Congress provided)