Jonathan Morales v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 710 F. App'x 362

Jonathan Morales was convicted of two counts of murder after an incident linked to a trip to purchase cocaine; he filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging trial counsel’s effectiveness.
After Morales’s state postconviction motion was denied, the Fourth District affirmed per curiam; the federal district court denied § 2254 relief and Morales appealed with a certificate of appealability on four ineffective-assistance claims.
Claim 1: Counsel allegedly failed to move to strike juror Karen Taylor after a court employee reported Taylor questioned why Morales would not testify.
Claim 2: Counsel allegedly failed to investigate and call potential witness Brandon Hammond, whose written statement said he never met Morales.
Claim 3: Counsel allegedly failed to object to prosecutor’s closing remarks characterizing Morales as part of a crew/gang that killed to silence witnesses.
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed these ineffective-assistance claims under Strickland and § 2254 standards and affirmed the denial of habeas relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Failure to strike juror	Juror Taylor’s comment about Morales not testifying showed partiality; counsel should have struck her	Taylor later affirmed she understood the right not to testify and could be fair; defense counsel and Morales wanted her retained	No ineffective assistance — juror’s sworn assurances were sufficient and counsel/defendant elected to keep her
Failure to call Hammond	Hammond’s written statement that he never met Morales would have exculpated Morales	Statement was consistent with trial testimony that someone else (not Morales) went into Hammond’s house; calling Hammond was unnecessary and strategic	No ineffective assistance — decision not to call Hammond fell within reasonable trial strategy and no prejudice shown
Failure to object to closing	Prosecutor’s gang/crew rhetoric was unsupported and prejudicial; counsel should have objected	Prosecutor’s characterization was reasonably supported by record facts about the trip, drug house, and motive	No ineffective assistance — remarks were supported by the record and not improper
Cumulative error	Multiple counsel errors together deprived Morales of a fair trial	Only the COA issues were considered; each raised claim was meritless, so nothing to cumulate	No relief — no meritorious errors to aggregate

Madison v. Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 851 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2017) (§ 2254 deference framework)
Shelton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2012) (treatment of unexplained state-court per curiam affirmance)
Wilson v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016) (identifying theories that could have supported state-court decision)
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (juror impartiality and for-cause removal)
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (juror can set aside impressions and follow law)
Hallford v. Culliver, 458 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2006) (presumption jurors follow court instructions)
Raleigh v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 827 F.3d 938 (11th Cir. 2016) (witness-selection is strategic choice)
Nejad v. Attorney Gen., State of Georgia, 830 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2016) (Strickland prejudice standard)
Stephens v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 678 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2012) (prosecutor-comment analysis)