19 F.4th 478
D.C. Cir.2021Background:
- In Jan 2021, following a presidential Executive Order and a DHS emergency determination, TSA issued security directives and an emergency amendment requiring masks in airports and on commercial aircraft (the "Mask Directives").
- The Mask Directives require passengers and employees to wear masks except for limited, specified exceptions and authorize operators to deny boarding and report noncompliance; civil penalties may apply.
- Jonathan Corbett, a frequent flyer, filed a petition for review under 49 U.S.C. § 46110 alleging the Mask Directives are ultra vires because TSA lacks statutory authority to regulate public-health measures like masking.
- The D.C. Circuit found Corbett had standing as a directly regulated person and applied Chevron deference to assess TSA’s statutory interpretation.
- On the merits the court held TSA’s authority under 49 U.S.C. § 114(f) and (g) reasonably encompasses measures (including masking) to address COVID-19 as a threat to transportation safety and security; the petition was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether petitioner has Article III standing to challenge TSA’s Mask Directives | Corbett: as a frequent flyer directly regulated by the directives, he is injured and faces enforcement risk | TSA: other orders (CDC/local laws) cause any obligation; petitioner lacks a concrete injury | Court: Corbett has standing as an object of the regulation and the injury is redressable |
| Whether TSA has statutory authority under 49 U.S.C. § 114 to require masking | Corbett: § 114 was meant to address violent/criminal threats to transportation, not general public-health measures | TSA: § 114 authorizes assessing and addressing threats to transportation safety/security; COVID-19 threatens operational viability | Court: § 114(f) reasonably covers measures to address COVID-19’s threat to transportation safety and security; directives are within TSA’s authority |
| Whether Chevron deference permits TSA’s interpretation of § 114 | Corbett: statutory text limits TSA to security narrowly defined; agency cannot expand authority to public health | TSA: Congress gave broad, flexible authority to address threats to transportation; agency expertise applies | Court: applied Chevron and deferred; statutory text does not foreclose TSA’s interpretation |
| Whether DHS’s national-emergency determination and § 114(g) independently authorize the Mask Directives | Corbett: not necessary or applicable to expand TSA power here | TSA: DHS declared a national emergency and directed TSA to act under § 114(g) | Court: DHS emergency finding invoked § 114(g) and provided additional delegated authority to issue the Mask Directives |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency statutory interpretations)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requirements)
- City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013) (agencies may resolve ambiguities in statutes they administer)
- Bonacci v. TSA, 909 F.3d 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (standing and broad TSA authority over aviation security)
- Olivares v. TSA, 819 F.3d 454 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (TSA authority to address safety and security concerns)
- Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (ripeness principles for regulated parties)
- Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485 (2021) (limits on CDC authority under a public-health statute; discussed by court)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary-and-capricious standard under the APA referenced for contrast)