Jonatan Henrriquez-Dubon v. Merrick Garland
20-70997
| 9th Cir. | Apr 4, 2022Background
- Petitioner Jonatan Henrriquez-Dubon sought cancellation of removal and needed to show he was a person of good moral character.
- The IJ and BIA found he had "knowingly . . . aided" an alien to enter the U.S. (payment to smuggle his stepson), a statutory bar to good moral character under the INA.
- The adverse finding rested primarily on a single, isolated statement by petitioner that contradicted his other testimony before and after that statement.
- The contested statement was given in Spanish in response to an English question translated for petitioner; petitioner prefaced his answer with "As I repeat to you," suggesting possible translation confusion.
- The Ninth Circuit majority held the agency’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence because the IJ/BIA relied on that isolated statement without addressing petitioner’s explanations or the record as a whole; the case was granted and remanded. Judge Miller dissented, concluding the record was not one that compelled reversal under the statutory standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether substantial evidence supports finding petitioner paid to smuggle his stepson (thus forfeiting good moral character) | Henrriquez-Dubon: the record shows he did not pay; the isolated admission is inconsistent and likely due to translation/confusion | Government: agency reasonably relied on petitioner’s admission and credibility determinations | Court: No — the finding was not supported by substantial evidence; agency relied on an isolated statement without addressing the rest of the record |
| Whether the IJ/BIA improperly cherry-picked an inconsistent statement and failed to address petitioner’s explanations | Petitioner: IJ/BIA ignored prior/subsequent consistent testimony and possible translation error; required reasoned analysis of whole record | Government: credibility judgments are entitled to deference; agency may rely on inconsistencies | Court: IJ/BIA erred by failing to provide a reasoned analysis addressing petitioner’s explanations (citing Tamang and Soto-Olarte); remand required |
| Whether any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the opposite result under the compelled-findings standard | Petitioner: the record compels finding he did not smuggle/aid entry | Government: credibility determinations are not reversible unless compelled | Court majority: remand because substantial-evidence error; dissent (Miller) would deny because not compelled under §1252(b)(4) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2016) (review of combined IJ and BIA decisions where BIA incorporates IJ findings)
- Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (substantial-evidence review standard for factual findings)
- Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversal requires evidence not only supporting but compelling contrary conclusion)
- INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (standard for reviewing factual findings in immigration cases)
- Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2010) (IJ must present reasoned analysis of the evidence as a whole; cannot selectively examine evidence)
- Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2009) (BIA must identify inconsistencies and address petitioner’s explanations in a reasoned manner)
- Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669 (2021) (standard that reversal requires that any reasonable adjudicator be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion)