356 So.3d 771
Fla.2023Background
- Hurricane Irma damaged Jon Parrish’s home; Parrish hired Keys Claims Consultants, Inc. (KCC) as a public adjuster on a 10% contingency of any recovery.
- KCC’s president, George Keys, was nominated by Parrish to serve as Parrish’s appraiser under the policy’s appraisal clause requiring each party to select a "qualified, disinterested appraiser."
- State Farm objected, arguing Keys was not “disinterested” because KCC had a contingency interest and represented Parrish; State Farm sought a court order compelling a disinterested appraiser.
- Trial court allowed Keys to serve (citing disclosure), but the Second District reversed, holding “disinterested” excludes an appraiser with a pecuniary interest or who represents the insured as a public adjuster; it certified conflict with the Third District.
- The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the Second District: in the policy context, “disinterested” has its plain meaning—no pecuniary interest—and a public adjuster paid on contingency cannot be a disinterested appraiser.
- The Court rejected arguments that “disinterested” meant merely “independent,” that disclosure cures the defect, or that ambiguity required construing the term for the insured; Justice Labarga dissented urging ambiguity and pro-insured construction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an appraiser whose firm will be paid a contingency fee as public adjuster can be a “disinterested” appraiser under the policy | "Disinterested" should allow appraisers paid on contingency; disclosure suffices; or term is ambiguous and must be construed for insured | "Disinterested" means free of pecuniary interest; contingency arrangements create a disqualifying financial interest | An appraiser (or a firm in which they have an interest) paid on contingency cannot be "disinterested" under the policy |
| Whether the contractual term "disinterested" is ambiguous | Term is ambiguous; could mean independent judgment or lack of affiliation; ambiguity resolves for insured | Term is not ambiguous; plain meaning excludes pecuniary interest | Term is unambiguous; plain meaning controls (no pecuniary interest) |
| Whether disclosure of the contingency or public-adjuster role cures disqualification | Disclosure of the relationship makes appointment permissible | Disclosure does not eliminate the pecuniary interest that disqualifies | Disclosure does not cure disqualification; pecuniary interest bars service as disinterested appraiser |
| Whether a public adjuster’s representation is analogous to an attorney-client conflict warranting disqualification | Public adjusters differ from attorneys; policy does not expressly prohibit contingency-paid appraisers | Public adjusters serve the same purpose (maximize insured recovery); their representation creates an interest inconsistent with “disinterested” | Court extends Branco’s reasoning: representation plus contingency creates disqualifying interest; public-adjuster-appraiser cannot be disinterested |
Key Cases Cited
- Brickell Harbour Condo. Ass’n v. Hamilton Specialty Ins. Co., 256 So. 3d 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (Third DCA treated a public adjuster with contingency interest as able to serve as "disinterested" appraiser)
- Florida Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Branco, 148 So. 3d 488 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (attorneys cannot serve as appraisers when a disinterested appraiser was bargained for)
- State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Crispin, 290 So. 3d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (public-adjuster paid by contingency cannot be a disinterested appraiser)
- State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Valenti, 285 So. 3d 958 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (concurring view that contingency interests disqualify)
- Galvis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 721 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (Third DCA equated “disinterested” with “independent” for appraisal purposes)
- Rios v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 714 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (Third DCA requiring appraisers be outside/unaffiliated with the parties)
- Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2005) (apply plain-meaning contract interpretation to insurance policies)
- Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Macedo, 228 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. 2017) (use dictionaries to determine undefined policy terms)
- Container Corp. of Am. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 707 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1998) (when terms are susceptible to different interpretations, construe ambiguities for insured; dictionaries may inform meaning)