Johnson v. United States, Department of Justice
694 F. App'x 748
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Reginald Johnson, pro se, sued multiple federal agencies and officials after a third party illegally moved his mailbox, alleging various harms including mental anguish and civil-rights violations.
- District court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
- On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed jurisdictional and merits rulings de novo, accepting Johnson’s factual allegations as true for 12(b)(6) purposes.
- Johnson pleaded claims under federal criminal statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a mental anguish/tort claim, and Title VII (the latter later abandoned on appeal).
- The court considered whether criminal statutes provide civil remedies, whether § 1981 applies to federal actors, and whether the Federal Tort Claims Act’s discretionary-function exception bars Johnson’s mental-anguish claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245 create civil causes of action | Johnson asserted those statutes support civil relief for harms from mailbox interference | Defendants argued those are criminal statutes that supply no civil remedy | Dismissed — criminal statutes provide no private civil remedy |
| Whether § 1981 applies to federal agencies/officials | Johnson claimed racial/discrimination-type claim under § 1981 against federal actors | Defendants argued § 1981 protects against nongovernmental or state-color discrimination only, not federal actors | Dismissed — § 1981 does not reach federal agencies or officials |
| Whether mental anguish claim can proceed against the United States under FTCA | Johnson claimed government’s failure to enforce laws caused mental pain, seeking recovery under tort law | Defendants asserted FTCA bars suits based on discretionary law-enforcement or prosecutorial decisions (discretionary-function exception) | Dismissed — discretionary-function exception bars recovery for enforcement decisions |
| Title VII claim viability on appeal | Johnson referenced Title VII in the complaint | Defendants maintained the claim was not pursued on appeal | Abandoned on appeal — plaintiff failed to brief the issue |
Key Cases Cited
- McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t, 501 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for 12(b)(1))
- Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cty., 685 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for 12(b)(6))
- Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1960) (criminal statutes provide no civil remedies)
- Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2002) (criminal statutes do not create civil causes of action)
- Lee v. Hughes, 145 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1998) (§ 1981 does not apply to federal actors)
- O’Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (FTCA governs certain tort claims against the United States)
- Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967) (discretionary-function exception bars suits based on prosecutorial/enforcement discretion)
- Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (prosecutorial decisions are classic discretionary functions exempt from FTCA liability)
- Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014) (issues not briefed on appeal are abandoned)
- Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008) (pro se briefs are read liberally but unbriefed issues are deemed abandoned)
AFFIRMED.
