Johnson v. Spencer, 950 F.3d 680

Background

In 1989 Johnson was convicted of aggravated burglary and first-degree sexual assault; he served 24 years and was declared actually innocent in 2013 after improved DNA testing excluded him.
While incarcerated Johnson filed two § 1983 suits: a 1991 suit against the City of Cheyenne and Detective Stanford (bench hearing, magistrate findings, dismissal with prejudice affirmed on appeal) and a 1992 suit against Officer Spencer (dismissed sua sponte as frivolous under then-28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and affirmed on appeal).
After exoneration Johnson filed a 2017 § 1983 action against Cheyenne, Detective Stanford’s Estate, and Officer Spencer alleging suppression/fabrication of evidence and failure to train; defendants moved to dismiss based on claim preclusion (res judicata).
The district court dismissed the 2017 action as precluded by the 1991 and 1992 judgments and denied Johnson’s Rule 60(b) motions to set aside the earlier judgments.
On appeal the Tenth Circuit vacated the denials of Rule 60(b)(6) relief (remanding for reconsideration under the correct legal standard), held Rule 60(b)(4) relief was not warranted, affirmed that the 1991 judgment is claim-preclusive, reversed that the 1992 dismissal had preclusive effect (because it was a § 1915(d) frivolous dismissal, not a merits adjudication), affirmed dismissal as to Cheyenne and the Estate, and reversed dismissal as to Officer Spencer.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Johnson)	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 1991/1992 judgments are void under Rule 60(b)(4) because Heck v. Humphrey shows the district court lacked jurisdiction when it entered them	Heck means plaintiffs bringing § 1983 claims attacking convictions lacked jurisdiction pre-invalidity; therefore earlier judgments are void	Prior courts had at least an arguable basis to exercise jurisdiction; Heck does not retroactively void final civil judgments; Rule 60(b)(4) relief requires either jurisdictional usurpation or deprivation of notice/hearing	Denied: Rule 60(b)(4) relief not warranted; district courts had an arguable basis for jurisdiction and Johnson waived due-process objections to the 1991 procedures on direct appeal
Whether the district court erred in denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief from the 1991/1992 judgments	Actual innocence and changed circumstances justify extraordinary relief under Rule 60(b)(6); equitable concepts from habeas are relevant; prior voluntary lawsuits should not automatically bar later relief	The district court reasonably exercised discretion; Rule 60(b)(6) is limited and should not reopen final judgments where plaintiffs made free, deliberate choices	Vacated and remanded: the district court applied erroneous legal rules (mistaken law/equity distinction and misapplied “free, calculated, deliberate” rationale); Rule 60(b)(6) relief is discretionary and merits fresh district-court consideration
Whether the 1991 judgment precludes Johnson’s 2017 claims (full-and-fair-opportunity to litigate)	The bench-trial procedure and denial of a jury trial deprived Johnson of a full and fair opportunity to litigate in 1991	Johnson had the opportunity to—and did—litigate procedure and appeal; he waived procedural objections by not raising them on direct appeal	Held preclusive: Johnson had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 1991 claims; dismissal of 2017 claims against Cheyenne and the Estate was affirmed
Whether the 1992 judgment precludes Johnson’s 2017 claims (was the 1992 dismissal "on the merits"?)	1992 dismissal should not preclude later suit because it was not a merits adjudication	The 1992 dismissal was final and should bar relitigation	Reversed: the 1992 dismissal was under § 1915(d) as frivolous (per Denton v. Hernandez), which is not a merits adjudication for res judicata; claims against Officer Spencer may proceed

Key Cases Cited

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 damages claims that would imply invalidity of conviction accrue only after conviction is invalidated)
United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010) (Rule 60(b) provides limited exceptions to finality; Rule 60(b)(4) voidness is narrow)
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992) (dismissals under pre-1996 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) for frivolousness are not adjudications on the merits)
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991) (principle that final civil judgments are not undone by later changes in law)
Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 847 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2017) (three elements of claim preclusion and recognition of full-and-fair-opportunity limitation)
MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing claim-preclusion requirements and exceptions)
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) (in forma pauperis frivolousness standard and court’s ability to pierce complaint veil)