Johnson v. Schonlaw
426 P.3d 345
Colo.2018Background
- Johnson sued VCG Restaurants and employee Schonlaw for injuries suffered outside a nightclub; jury found both liable and awarded damages (judgments: $74,452.83 against Schonlaw; $246,462 against VCG).
- After trial evidence closed, the parties had an alternate juror who had participated in pre-deliberation discussion without objection; Johnson agreed to let the alternate deliberate, but Schonlaw and VCG objected and the trial court overruled the objection.
- The jury (seven jurors, including the alternate) deliberated for about three days and returned verdicts signed by all seven members after Johnson withdrew his punitive damages claim.
- The court of appeals reversed, holding that permitting an alternate to deliberate over objection was error giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice (relying on People v. Boulies) and remanded for a new trial.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted review solely on whether the error is subject to harmless-error analysis under C.R.C.P. 61 or instead triggers a presumption of prejudice requiring reversal.
- The Supreme Court held the error was subject to harmless-error review and was harmless on this record, reversed the court of appeals, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Johnson) | Defendant's Argument (Schonlaw/VCG) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether allowing an alternate juror to deliberate over objection is an error subject to harmless-error review or requires reversal based on a presumption of prejudice | Error is reviewable for harmlessness under C.R.C.P. 61; not structural; harmless here | Participation of an alternate over objection presumed prejudicial (invoking Boulies); requires reversal absent rebuttal | Harmless-error standard applies; the error did not substantially influence the outcome and was harmless |
| Whether an alternate’s participation automatically yields structural error or presumed prejudice | No; alternate participation is not structural and can be reviewed under Novotny/Newman harmless-error framework | Alternate participation raises rebuttable presumption of prejudice that often defies harmless-error review | Court rejects automatic presumption for civil cases here; applies case-specific harmless-error inquiry |
| Whether Novotny/Newman and related harmless-error principles displace Boulies presumption in civil context | Modern harmless-error precedents control and require outcome-determinative analysis | Boulies still governs where errors defy harmless-error review; should not be overruled by implication | Court treats Novotny/Newman as controlling; Boulies presumption undermined by later developments and inapplicable here |
| Whether trial court acted in bad faith or such that higher scrutiny is required | No bad faith; trial court exercised discretion and the alternate had been vetted and participated in pre-deliberation without challenge | Even absent bad faith, prejudice is presumed and unrebutted | No bad faith found; absence of bad faith supports harmless-error inquiry and rejection of presumption here |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Boulies, 690 P.2d 1253 (Colo. 1984) (recognized a presumption of prejudice when an alternate participates in deliberations)
- United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (discusses harmless-error vs. structural error and when plain-error review applies)
- People v. Novotny, 320 P.3d 1194 (Colo. 2014) (calls for case-specific, outcome-determinative harmless-error analysis)
- Laura A. Newman, LLC v. Roberts, 365 P.3d 972 (Colo. 2016) (applies C.R.C.P. 61 harmless-error analysis in civil cases; abandons automatic reversal in certain jury-selection errors)
- James v. People, 426 P.3d 336 (Colo. 2018) (held alternate participation in criminal deliberations subject to harmless-error review and refined application of Novotny)