Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Cooperative Oil Co.
2012 Minn. LEXIS 380
| Minn. | 2012Background
- Pesticide drift from Cooperative sprayed onto adjacent conventional fields allegedly contaminated Johnsons’ organic fields.
- Johnsons asserted trespass, nuisance, negligence per se, and battery, seeking damages and injunctive relief.
- MDA investigations confirmed drift incidents in 2007 and 2008 with various pesticide detections; OCIA advised potential 36-month transition restart.
- District court granted summary judgment to Cooperative; court of appeals reversed and remanded on some claims.
- Court held: trespass claim fails as matter of law and nuisance/negligence per se claims based on 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(b) fail, but non-§ 205.202(b) nuisance claims and injunction request survive; remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trespass via particulate matter feasible in Minnesota? | Johnson, as owner with exclusive possession, alleges drift constitutes trespass. | Cooperative argues tangible entry required; drift is not trespass. | Trespass claim fails; intangible drift does not constitute trespass under Minnesota law. |
| Do nuisance and negligence per se claims based on 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(b) fail for lack of damages? | Johnsons argue 205.202(b) requires 3-year transition due to drift, causing damages. | § 205.202(b) governs producer’s intentional application, not third-party drift; damages not proven. | Claims based on 205.202(b) fail as a matter of law; district court properly granted summary judgment on those claims. |
| Does 7 C.F.R. § 205.202(b) apply to third-party drift or only to the producer’s intentional application? | Readers argue drift falls within ‘applied to it’. | regulation targets producer’s actions; drift by third party not covered. | Unambiguous: § 205.202(b) regulates producer’s intentional application, not third-party drift. |
| District court erred in denying amendment to include 2008 incidents not based on trespass or § 205.202(b)? | Amendment should be allowed to plead non-§ 205.202(b) damages. | Amendment futile for those claims. | Amendment should be allowed for non-trespass, non-205.202(b) theories; otherwise denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546 (Minn.App. 2003) (trespass by particulate matter not recognized in Minnesota)
- Fagerlie v. City of Willmar, 435 N.W.2d 641 (Minn.App. 1989) (odor nuisance—not trespass)
- Greenwood v. Evergreen Mines Co., 220 Minn. 296 (1945) (trespass can occur with invasion of land by certain encroachments)
- Whittaker v. Stangvick, 100 Minn. 386 (1907) (trespass involves direct invasion; nuisance for use/enjoyment)
- Sime v. Jensen, 213 Minn. 476 (1942) (nominal damages available for trespass without actual damages)
- Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174 (1944) (trespass and exclusive possession concepts)
- Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523 (Ala. 1979) (intangible intrusion cases; foreseeability/damages limits)
- Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985) (particulate invasion cases; balance of damages/foreseeability)
- Anderson v. Department of Natural Resources, 693 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005) (duty in adjoining land cases; negligence framework)
- Highview N. Apartments v. County of Ramsey, 323 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 1982) (disruption/inconvenience actionable in nuisance)