Johnny Gatewood v. United States, 979 F.3d 391

In 1997 Gatewood was convicted of two kidnappings and one Hobbs Act robbery and sentenced to life under the federal three‑strikes statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), based on four prior Arkansas robbery convictions; the Sixth Circuit affirmed and certiorari was denied.
In 2016 Gatewood filed a § 2255 motion arguing his state robbery priors were counted only under the statute’s residual clause, which (he argued) is void for vagueness in light of Johnson and, later, Davis.
The government initially argued the § 2255 filing was untimely but on appeal conceded Davis rendered Gatewood’s motion timely; the district court had denied relief as untimely and granted a COA limited to the vagueness/timeliness question.
The government alternatively argued Gatewood procedurally defaulted by not raising the vagueness claim on direct appeal and argued the priors also qualify under the enumerated‑offenses or elements clauses.
The Sixth Circuit accepted the government’s concession on timeliness but held Gatewood’s vagueness claim is procedurally defaulted because he had a reasonable basis to raise it on direct review; the court affirmed without reaching the merits of the alternative § 3559(c) arguments.

Issue	Gatewood's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Timeliness of § 2255 under § 2255(f)(3) based on Johnson/Davis	Motion timely because Davis (and Johnson) rendered residual clause claims newly recognized and retroactive	Initially: untimely; On appeal: concedes Davis makes the motion timely	Government conceded timeliness; court accepted concession (timeliness not dispositive)
Procedural default — whether failure to raise vagueness on direct appeal can be excused (cause)	Claim was novel or foreclosed such that counsel reasonably could not have raised it (Reed/futility)	No cause: the legal tools existed pre‑2002; adverse lower‑court precedent does not excuse default	No cause; claim was reasonably available at time of direct appeal (1997–2002); procedural default bars collateral review
Merits — whether Gatewood’s priors qualify under enumerated‑offenses or elements clause	Priors only qualified via residual clause (now void)	Priors also qualify under enumerated or elements clauses	Court did not reach merits; affirmed on procedural‑default grounds

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held unconstitutionally vague)
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (§ 924(c) residual clause held unconstitutionally vague; key basis for timeliness concession)
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984) (cause can exist when Supreme Court precedent at time of default expressly forecloses claim later overruled)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (futility alone cannot constitute cause to excuse procedural default)
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (rejected vagueness challenge to ACCA residual clause prior to Johnson)
Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011) (reaffirmed validity of ACCA residual clause prior to Johnson)
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) (statute‑of‑limitations defense may be waived by government concession on appeal)
Cvijetinovic v. Eberlin, 617 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 2010) (adverse lower‑court precedent usually does not establish cause for procedural default)
Raines v. United States, 898 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2018) (found cause where Johnson postdated petitioner’s direct appeal because Supreme Court had previously foreclosed the claim)
United States v. Gatewood, 230 F.3d 186 (6th Cir. 2000) (prior appeal affirming Gatewood’s life sentence under three‑strikes statute)