Johnnie Williams v. Lance Corporal Kyle Strickland, 917 F.3d 763

On June 29, 2012, Johnnie Williams drove into South Carolina with his six-year-old son; Officer Heroux ran the license plate, found it stolen, and initiated a stop in an apartment parking lot.
As Heroux approached, Williams shifted into reverse rotating the car toward Heroux; Heroux drew his weapon. Officer Strickland moved toward the vehicle; Williams put the car in drive and drove off.
Heroux and Strickland opened fire; one of Heroux’s shots struck Williams in the back, causing severe, lifelong injuries. Williams later pleaded guilty to related assault charges and admitted he had rotated the car toward Heroux and driven toward Strickland, but also agreed the car had passed the officers when shooting began.
Williams sued Strickland and Heroux under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; the officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
The district court denied qualified immunity, reasoning a jury could find the officers fired after the car had passed or was passing the officers (i.e., no longer in their trajectory), which would violate clearly established law from Waterman v. Batton.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, reviewing only the qualified-immunity denial under the collateral-order doctrine and assuming the district court’s facts most favorable to Williams.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether firing after the car was no longer in the officers’ trajectory violated the Fourth Amendment	Williams: deadly force was excessive if officers fired once car had passed them	Officers: they reasonably believed Williams would imminently run over Strickland, so deadly force was justified	If officers fired after they were not in the car’s trajectory, that use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment (no)
Whether the right was clearly established as of June 29, 2012	Williams: Waterman clearly established limits on using deadly force against a car driver once the car is no longer a threat	Officers: factual distinctions could shield them under qualified immunity	Waterman and related precedent gave fair warning; right was clearly established (no qualified immunity)
Scope of appellate review of denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity	Williams: denial is reviewable under collateral-order doctrine	Officers: appeal of interlocutory denial is improper	Denial is collateral and immediately appealable; review limited to facts as the district court gave them in plaintiff’s favor
Whether summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds is appealable here (Heroux only)	Heroux: claim against him was untimely	Williams: district court correctly denied timeliness defense	The court declined to review that interlocutory denial for lack of appellate jurisdiction (left undisturbed)

Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2005) (use of deadly force justified while officers remain in car’s trajectory but unlawful once car has passed)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force against fleeing suspect requires probable cause that suspect poses immediate significant threat of death or serious injury)
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008) (denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment is collateral order reviewable on appeal)
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014) (do not define clearly established law at high level of generality)
Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011) (excessive-force analysis uses objective-reasonableness test)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts may address prong of qualified immunity in either order)
Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2018) (clarifies inquiry into whether law was clearly established)