Johnathan Renard Castaneda v. State, 01-14-00389-CR

Background

Johnathan Castaneda was tried jointly on indictments for murder (death of Keith Armstrong) and aggravated sexual assault (of Patricia Asberry); jury convicted on both counts; sentences: 45 years for murder, mandatory life for enhanced aggravated sexual assault.
Disputed facts: both agree Armstrong threatened people with a firearm; they disagree whether Armstrong pointed/shot at Castaneda and whether Castaneda intended to kill him. Asberry’s testimony implicated Castaneda in a post‑altercation sexual assault; Castaneda testified he acted fearing for his life.
Physical and forensic evidence showed severe blunt‑force trauma to Armstrong consistent with multiple blows; crime‑scene officers found no firearm or casings.
Defense requested lesser‑included instructions (aggravated assault and manslaughter) and raised self‑defense; trial court denied the lesser instructions and submitted a lengthy/complex self‑defense charge that omitted an explicit statement that the State bears the burden to disprove self‑defense.
Defense filed a timely motion for new trial with affidavits from multiple mitigation witnesses (mental‑health history, head injury) alleging counsel failed to present mitigation; the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing. The bill of costs included a $250 DNA fee.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Castaneda)	Held (as argued in brief)
1. Denial of aggravated‑assault lesser‑included instruction in murder charge	Murder subsumes aggravated assault but the proof supports murder only	Castaneda testified he lacked intent to kill; some evidence supports aggravated assault as a lesser included offense	Trial court erred by refusing instruction; harm is non‑harmless because sentence for murder far exceeds aggravated assault (argued reversible)
2. Denial of manslaughter lesser‑included instruction	Manslaughter differs and need not be submitted absent evidence of sudden passion / adequate cause	Evidence of fear, anger, and provocation (gun threats) supports manslaughter arising from sudden passion	Manslaughter is a lesser‑included offense of murder and evidence supports submission; denial was harmful (argued reversible)
3. Jury charge on self‑defense / burden of proof	Charge sufficiently instructed jury on elements	Charge was confusing and lengthy; omitted clear statement that State must disprove self‑defense beyond a reasonable doubt, and contained provisions (duty to retreat, "ordinary person" concept) that could confuse jury	Charge was erroneous and, because no contemporaneous objection, alleged egregious harm warranting reversal or new trial (as argued)
4. Sufficiency of evidence for aggravated sexual assault deadly‑weapon finding	Evidence (metal bar present, used earlier in fight) supports deadly‑weapon allegation	No proof metal bar was used or exhibited during the sexual assault; mere presence on table insufficient to prove use/exhibition and to put complainant in danger	Argued insufficient evidence to support the deadly‑weapon element; conviction should be reversed/acquitted on that count
5. Motion for new trial hearing re: mitigation / ineffective assistance	No hearing required where record is conclusive	Affidavits raise matters outside the record (failure to present mitigation); a hearing is required to develop facts and decide ineffective‑assistance claim	Trial court abused discretion by denying a hearing on the submitted affidavits (argued remand for hearing/new punishment)
6. DNA record fee assessment	Fee is authorized by statute as a court cost	Fee is an unconstitutional tax because proceeds are not necessarily used for court‑related functions (Peraza reasoning)	Argued DNA fee should be stricken from costs as unconstitutional (relief sought on appeal)

Key Cases Cited

Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (standard for harm review of jury‑charge error)
Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (manslaughter can be a lesser‑included offense of murder where only mental‑state differs)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (constitutional standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (analysis of what constitutes "use or exhibition" of a deadly weapon)
Plummer v. State, 410 S.W.3d 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (deadly‑weapon findings require proof of use/exhibition beyond mere possession)
Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (jury charge must distinctly set forth applicable law; confusing self‑defense charges are reversible error)
Trevino v. State, 100 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (standards for submitting lesser‑included offenses)