849 F.3d 728
8th Cir.2017Background
- John Young was Mercer County elected part-time prosecutor and also ran a private practice; the county leased his office building to house both functions under a written Agreement that provided county secretarial support and $350/month in rent to Young.
- Mercer County Commission adopted a 911 ordinance assigning fixed street addresses; the Youngs’ address became “20667 Gaza Place,” which they publicly complained about and sought to change to Highway 65.
- After Young threatened litigation, the Commission obtained counsel who advised the Agreement likely violated the Missouri Constitution (payment to prosecutor, use of county secretary for private work).
- The Commission (1) denied a budget request for part-time secretarial help, and on March 31, 2014 (2) terminated the Agreement, (3) suspended the $350 monthly rent payments, and (4) sent a letter requesting the state attorney general investigate the Agreement.
- The Youngs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (retaliation/First Amendment), sought declaratory relief, and asserted a takings claim; the district court dismissed some claims, then granted summary judgment to defendants on retaliation (immunity) and to defendants on takings (Youngs do not appeal takings here).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Commissioners are entitled to absolute legislative immunity for passing the 911 ordinance and assigning Gaza Place address | Young: ordinance and address assignment targeted them and were not legislative | Defs: passing/addressing via ordinance is quintessential legislative act | Held: Legislative immunity applies to passing the ordinance and address assignment | |
| Whether denial of Young's budget request is legislative | Young: denial was administrative/retaliatory, not legislative | Defs: budget decisions are discretionary legislative policymaking under state law | Held: Legislative immunity applies to the budget denial | |
| Whether terminating the Agreement and stopping rent payments are legislative acts | Young: termination was administrative/adjudicative and not legislative; budget for year already set | Young: actions were targeted and thus not legislative | Defs: County had statutory duty to provide office space and funding; termination was a legislative decision with prospective effect | Held: Majority—legislative immunity applies; Concurrence—would treat these acts as nonlegislative but find qualified immunity; overall summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether requesting the attorney general investigate the Agreement is protected by qualified immunity | Young: request was retaliatory speech suppression and clearly violated First Amendment | Defs: commissioners acted on counsel’s advice and did not violate a clearly established right | Held: Qualified immunity applies to the AG-request letter |
Key Cases Cited
- Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (local legislators absolutely immune for legislative activities)
- Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (legislative immunity protects legislative discretion)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires an official policy or custom)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity framework; courts may address ‘‘clearly established’’ prong first)
- Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (First Amendment retaliation right must be particularized to be clearly established)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (clarifies clearly established right standard for qualified immunity)
- Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389 (reliance on counsel is relevant in qualified immunity analysis)