John Vetter, plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant v. State of Iowa, Iowa Department of Natural Resources, Aaron Lumley and Paul Tauke, defendants-appellants/cross-appellees.
16-0208
| Iowa Ct. App. | May 17, 2017Background
- John Vetter worked for Iowa DNR from 1976; he suffered a work-related back injury in 2011, had spinal surgery, returned to work in 2012 and performed duties with occasional help and light-duty modifications.
- A September 2012 functional capacity evaluation produced permanent work restrictions (limits on lifting, sitting, standing, walking, bending, climbing; no squatting). DNR received those restrictions in January 2013.
- DNR obtained two workplace assessments (based largely on supervisor input, without consulting Vetter) that recommended accommodations; DNR concluded accommodations posed an undue burden and terminated Vetter, citing cost/undue hardship.
- Vetter sued under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), alleging disability discrimination (disparate treatment), failure to reasonably accommodate, and alternatively perceived-disability discrimination.
- A jury found for Vetter on disability discrimination and failure-to-accommodate, awarded approximately $599,732 in compensatory damages (plus front pay later awarded by the court); trial court denied defendant’s JNOV and new-trial motions and awarded attorney fees; State appealed and Vetter cross-appealed litigation expenses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether substantial evidence showed Vetter had a disability under ICRA | Vetter: permanent restrictions and expert testimony show a musculoskeletal impairment substantially limiting major life activities (lifting, sitting, standing, walking, bending) | State: impairments were temporary or not substantially limiting; Vetter performed job duties and restrictions don’t establish disability | Court: Substantial evidence supports that Vetter had a disability (permanent restrictions and testimony) |
| Whether Vetter was qualified for his position | Vetter: performed essential functions with accommodations; thus qualified | State: did not contest at appeal; argued performance negates disability | Court: Vetter was a qualified employee with ability to perform essential functions with accommodation |
| Whether termination and failure-to-accommodate were adverse actions motivated by disability | Vetter: DNR terminated him solely because of disability/undue hardship and failed to engage him in interactive process | State: cited undue burden, claimed Vetter didn’t request accommodation and relied on business judgment | Held: DNR’s stated reason was disability-based (direct evidence); duty to engage in interactive process triggered by DNR’s knowledge; jury verdict on both termination and failure-to-accommodate upheld |
| Jury instructions and burdens (business-judgment, unconscious bias, pretext, accommodation notice) | Vetter: requested instructions on unconscious bias and pretext; court instructed on accommodation triggering employer duty without express employee request when disability is obvious | State: sought business-judgment instruction and objected to unconscious-bias and pretext instructions as misstating law/ lowering burden | Court: Failure to give business-judgment instruction and giving unconscious-bias and pretext instructions were errors but harmless because case involved direct disability-based reasoning; the accommodation instruction correctly stated law (no express request needed when employer knows of disability) |
| Whether emotional-distress damages were excessive/passionate | Vetter: long tenure, age, emotional harm, family testimony support award | State: award excessive, Vetter lacked medical treatment for emotional distress, trial passion influenced jury | Court: award not excessive given evidence, length of employment, reputational/psychological harms; denial of new trial affirmed |
| Whether trial court properly denied litigation-expense items (copying, research, mileage, etc.) | Vetter: ICRA allows reasonable attorney fees including out-of-pocket expenses; trial court misread its authority | State: trial court limited awards to statutorily enumerated items | Court: Trial court erred by denying those expenses as it mistakenly believed it lacked authority; remanded to determine reasonable litigation expenses and appellate fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (distinguishes disparate-treatment and disparate-impact theories and discusses proof of discriminatory motive)
- Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc. v. Blackford, 661 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 2003) (elements of ICRA disability-discrimination and requirement of interactive reasonable-accommodation process)
- Boelman v. Manson State Bank, 522 N.W.2d 73 (Iowa 1994) (when employer’s adverse action is based on disability-related reasons, direct-evidence analysis applies)
- Bearshield v. John Morrell & Co., 570 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1997) (uses ADA and federal regulations to interpret ICRA "disability" definition)
- Woodbury Cty. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 335 N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1983) (employer entitled to exercise business judgment absent pretext for discrimination)
- Deboom v. Raining Rose, 772 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2009) (approved form of pretext instruction for motivating-factor causation under discrimination law)