842 S.E.2d 716
W. Va.2020Background
- On May 8, 2015, petitioner John R. Zsigray received an incorrect McDonald’s drive‑thru order, used vulgar language at manager Cindy Langman, and demanded a refund; Langman reported the incident to police.
- Trooper K.J. Varner investigated, reviewed video, took a written statement from Langman (which alleged prior belligerent incidents), and charged Zsigray with misdemeanor harassment; a magistrate jury later acquitted him.
- Zsigray sued Langman and McDonald’s for defamation (based on Langman’s statements to police and her trial testimony), outrage, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- The circuit court granted Langman’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion dismissing the defamation claim as absolutely privileged (both police statements and trial testimony) but allowed the other tort claims to proceed; later the court granted Langman summary judgment on outrage/IIED.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment on the outrage/IIED claims, affirmed absolute privilege for Langman’s trial testimony, reversed dismissal as to the statements to the trooper (finding they may be only qualifiedly privileged when bad motive is alleged), and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are a witness’s trial statements absolutely privileged from defamation liability? | Zsigray: testimony was defamatory and actionable. | Langman: testimony is absolutely privileged as part of judicial proceedings. | Court: Trial testimony by a judicial fact witness is absolutely privileged when relevant to the proceeding; dismissal affirmed. |
| Are statements to police during investigation absolutely privileged? | Zsigray: statements to trooper were false, malicious, and not privileged. | Langman: statements to police were part of instituting judicial process and absolutely privileged (alternatively qualifiedly privileged). | Court: Statements to police are not automatically absolutely privileged; they may be qualifiedly privileged and dismissal was improper as to those statements. |
| Can alleged malice/bad motive defeat a privilege for reports to police? | Zsigray: alleged malicious intent defeats privilege and supports defamation claim. | Langman: she acted in good faith to protect safety and business; privilege applies. | Court: Allegations of bad motive in the complaint suffice to survive Rule 12(b)(6); remanded for further proceedings on this aspect. |
| Did Langman’s conduct support outrage / IIED claims as a matter of law? | Zsigray: reporting and conduct caused severe emotional distress and were outrageous. | Langman: reporting to police after being verbally abused is not extreme or outrageous. | Court: Reporting to law enforcement and the facts here are not extreme or outrageous as a matter of law; summary judgment for Langman affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chapman v. Kane Transfer Co., Inc., 160 W. Va. 530 (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal standard)
- State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac‑Buick, Inc., 194 W. Va. 770 (appellate review of dismissal is de novo)
- Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189 (summary judgment reviewed de novo)
- Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W. Va. 52 (summary judgment standard)
- Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 173 W. Va. 699 (elements of defamation by a private individual)
- Wilson v. Bernet, 218 W. Va. 628 (absolute immunity for adverse expert witness testimony)
- Collins v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 211 W. Va. 458 (absolute privilege for statements preliminary to or in judicial proceedings when requirements met)
- Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (U.S. Supreme Court rationale for witness absolute immunity)
- Belcher v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 211 W. Va. 712 (qualified privilege for employee reports to police in investigatory context)
- Travis v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 202 W. Va. 369 (elements and court’s gatekeeper role for IIED/outrage claim)