177 A.3d 482
R.I.2018Background
- John R. Grasso, a former Cranston police officer, received an accidental disability pension in 2002 after an on-duty injury that prevented him from returning to police work.
- In 2012 the Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI) notified Grasso of an alleged overpayment, sought medical records and tax returns, and indicated he might be required to undergo an independent medical examination (IME) and income reporting under G.L. 1956 §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24.
- Grasso sued for a declaratory judgment (PC 13-3121) arguing that the 1980 amendment to § 45-21.2-10 removed §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 from applying to accidental-disability pensions under chapter 21.2; ERSRI administratively and then judicially maintained those sections apply.
- The Retirement Board upheld its determinations after a hearing; Grasso appealed administratively to Superior Court (PC 14-4953) and filed the declaratory action; the Superior Court consolidated the matters and ruled for Grasso, holding §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 did not apply.
- The Supreme Court granted review, conducted de novo statutory interpretation, and vacated the Superior Court’s judgment, holding chapter 21.2 accidental-disability pensions are subject to §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §§ 45-21-23 (annual IME) and 45-21-24 (income reporting/adjustment) apply to accidental-disability pensions under chapter 21.2 § 45-21.2-10 | Grasso: 1980 amendment replaced the pre-1980 text and limited § 45-21.2-10 to a cross-reference to § 45-21-22, removing any applicability of §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 | Defendants (ERSRI/State): chapter 21.2 is administered in same manner as chapter 21; §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 apply to “any disability annuitant,” so they cover chapter 21.2 accidental-disability pensioners | Held: §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 apply; the statutory scheme is ambiguous after the 1980 amendment and the most plausible, harmonious interpretation is that IME and income-adjustment provisions apply to chapter 21.2 accidental-disability annuitants |
| Whether the trial court should defer to ERSRI's statutory interpretation on the applicability of chapter 21 provisions | Grasso: statutory text (post-1980) is clear and limits § 45-21.2-10 to § 45-21-22, so no deference needed | ERSRI: agency interpretation entitled to weight when statute unclear | Held: Court reviews statutory construction de novo; agency deference not controlling here though the agency’s interpretation is considered in the ambiguity analysis |
| Whether the 1980 legislative change should be read as an explicit legislative intent to exempt chapter 21.2 pensions from chapter 21 requirements | Grasso: deletion of pre-1980 language shows legislative intent to exempt | Defendants: silence and cross-references elsewhere create ambiguity; legislative purpose supports applying chapter 21 safeguards | Held: Deletion alone insufficient to show clear legislative intent to create an unconditional lifelong accidental-disability pension; statutory silence is inadequate to displace IME/income-reporting rules |
| Whether applying §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 to chapter 21.2 pensions produces an absurd result | Grasso: applying them would be inconsistent with legislative scheme for chapter 21.2 | Defendants: applying IME/income-reporting is consistent with purpose of preventing improper continued benefits | Held: Not absurd; ordinary rules of construction favor reading the statutes to permit IMEs and income adjustments to effectuate the purpose of disability pensions |
Key Cases Cited
- High Steel Structures, Inc. v. Cardi Corp., 152 A.3d 429 (R.I. 2017) (standard for de novo review of summary judgment)
- Mancini v. City of Providence, 155 A.3d 159 (R.I. 2017) (analysis of deference to agency statutory interpretations)
- In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482 (R.I. 2011) (ultimate judicial authority to construe statutes despite agency view)
- State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546 (R.I. 2014) (apply plain meaning when statute is unambiguous)
- Bailey v. American Stores, Inc./Star Market, 610 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1992) (construe statute consistent with purpose)
- Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (U.S. 2001) (legislature does not hide major changes in ambiguous or silent text)
- Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (U.S. 2000) (expectation of clear statement when statute would cause major regulatory consequences)
- Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 316 U.S. 4 (U.S. 1942) (caution against inferring legislative intent from silence)