John Karl Rudolph v. Debra Ann Jamieson
03-17-00693-CV
| Tex. App. | Jan 5, 2018Background
- John Rudolph and Debra Jamieson divorced in 2009; the Final Decree awarded Jamieson a percentage of Rudolph’s disposable retired pay (DRP) using a formula and appointed Rudolph as constructive trustee for payments not made directly by DFAS.
- Rudolph was injured in 2007; he entered the Temporary Disability Retired List in 2014 and was placed on the Permanent Disability Retired List (PDRL) effective January 28, 2016, receiving disability retirement under 10 U.S.C. Chapter 61.
- The parties entered an Order on Clarification of Domestic Relations Order (DRO) in February 2016 reiterating that Jamieson’s award was a share of disposable retired pay and anticipating DFAS direct payment where allowed.
- DFAS informed Jamieson it could not garnish disposable retired pay because Rudolph’s pay was characterized as Chapter 61 disability retirement (i.e., not DRP).
- The trial court, in a 2017 Order, awarded Jamieson $1,540/month (stated to be 41.1157% of any benefits paid regularly to Rudolph as a result of his military service), ordering payment "regardless of how they may be characterized by DFAS." Rudolph moved to reform and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Rudolph's Argument | Jamieson's Argument | Held (Appellant's position) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court’s July 26, 2017 order substantively modified the DRO/Decree beyond a permissible clarification | The order altered the substantive property division by converting a percentage of DRP into a fixed dollar award payable from any military benefits — an unauthorized modification prohibited by Tex. Fam. Code § 9.007 | The trial court intended to protect Former Spouse’s property interest and ensure she receives the awarded share regardless of DFAS characterization | The July 26, 2017 order is a substantive modification, not a clarification, and therefore beyond the court’s power under § 9.007 and void. |
| Whether the court may award a share of Chapter 61 medical disability retirement (non‑DRP) | Federal law (USFSPA and Mansell) prohibits state courts from treating Chapter 61 disability retirement as divisible DRP; Jamieson was only awarded DRP in the Decree | The court believed it should ensure Former Spouse receives her share of benefits "regardless of how characterized by DFAS" to avoid denial of a property interest | Awarding a share of Chapter 61 medical disability pay is unlawful; the Decree/DRO only authorized DRP and cannot be expanded to include Chapter 61 pay. |
| Whether DFAS characterization can be disregarded by the state court | DFAS applied 10 U.S.C. § 1408 and determined Rudolph had no DRP; state court may not override federal characterization to create divisible property | Court sought to avoid defeating Former Spouse’s award where DFAS would not pay directly | Federal characterization controls under USFSPA; state court cannot treat non‑DRP Chapter 61 benefits as divisible DRP. |
| Remedy and restitution for payments already made under the July 26 order | July 26 order is void; appellant seeks reversal and remand with instruction to order return of funds paid to Former Spouse | Former Spouse contends she is entitled to the awarded amount and protections to receive it | Appellant requests reversal and an order requiring repayment; court should reverse and render or remand to order reimbursement. |
Key Cases Cited
- Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983) (if a written instrument has a definite legal meaning it is not ambiguous)
- Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2003) (trial court cannot alter an unambiguous divorce decree under guise of clarification)
- Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. 2009) (presumption that divorce court chose language carefully; scope of enforcement vs. modification under family code)
- DeGroot v. DeGroot, 260 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008) (orders violating Tex. Fam. Code § 9.007 are void)
- Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (U.S. 1989) (USFSPA prevents state courts from treating Chapter 61 disability retirement as divisible property)
- Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (U.S. 2017) (Supreme Court reaffirming limits on state courts’ ability to divide military disability benefits)
- Hicks v. Hicks, 348 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011) (state divorce courts may only divide disposable retired pay as defined by federal law)