John Harden v. Keith Hillman
993 F.3d 465
| 6th Cir. | 2021Background
- Plaintiff John Harden (African American) went to a Thorntons convenience store after hours; store clerk refused to sell him beer and told him not to return. Officer Keith Hillman, in uniform providing security for Thorntons, told Harden to leave and later physically restrained, slammed, handcuffed, and transported him; Hillman issued citations (later dismissed).
- Harden sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against Hillman, the City of Heritage Creek, and Thorntons; all claims except an individual-capacity excessive-force claim against Hillman were dismissed pretrial or on summary judgment.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Hillman on Harden’s claim that his arrest lacked probable cause (Harden appealed that ruling). Only the excessive-force claim went to a jury trial; the jury returned a verdict for Hillman.
- Harden filed a first Motion for New Trial alleging (1) the court refused to order the U.S. Marshals to serve his subpoenas (so key witnesses did not appear) and (2) improper remarks by defense counsel; the district court denied relief.
- Harden filed a second Motion for New Trial supported by an affidavit from juror T.H., alleging deliberations tainted by racial stereotyping (e.g., jurors called Harden a “crack addict,” said his calmness meant drug use, described his counsel as the “Cosby Show”), that a juror concealed familial police ties during voir dire, and that a juror misstated the law; the district court excluded the affidavit under Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) and denied a new trial.
- The Sixth Circuit: affirmed summary judgment on the no-probable-cause claim and affirmed denial of Harden’s first new-trial motion; vacated denial of the second new-trial motion and remanded for a Remmer hearing to probe juror bias under the Pena-Rodriguez framework.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hillman lacked probable cause for arrest (false arrest §1983 claim) | Harden: Hillman lacked authority to revoke his permission to be on Thorntons property, so no probable cause for criminal trespass | Hillman: as Thorntons security he had apparent authority to exclude patrons; Harden knowingly reentered after being told not to return, supporting probable cause for criminal trespass II | Affirmed: officer had apparent authority and facts known to him supported probable cause for trespass II (summary judgment proper) |
| Whether denial of first Motion for New Trial was error (Marshals subpoenas + defense counsel remarks) | Harden: court’s refusal to order Marshals to serve subpoenas deprived him of witnesses and a fair trial; defense counsel’s remarks about missing witnesses were improper | Hillman: no right to Marshals service for non-indigent plaintiff; plaintiff could hire process servers; counsel’s remarks were fair comment on paucity of plaintiff’s evidence | Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion; plaintiff could have served witnesses and no reversible misconduct shown |
| Whether juror T.H.’s affidavit alleging racial stereotyping, juror lied in voir dire, and juror mis-stated law warrants a new trial (Rule 606(b) / Pena-Rodriguez) | Harden: T.H.’s affidavit alleges overt racial stereotyping that materially tainted deliberations and overcomes Rule 606(b) under Pena-Rodriguez; court must hold a Remmer hearing | Hillman: Rule 606(b) bars juror testimony about deliberations; allegations are internal/offhand or insufficiently tied to race to meet Pena-Rodriguez | Reversed in part: affidavit raises a colorable Pena-Rodriguez claim; district court abused discretion by excluding it—vacated denial and remanded for a Remmer hearing to investigate juror bias and grant new trial if bias prejudicially affected deliberations |
Key Cases Cited
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (an officer’s subjective reason for an arrest need not match the offense supplying probable cause)
- Pena‑Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (Supreme Court exception to no‑impeachment rule where juror statements show racial animus that materially motivated verdict)
- Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40 (Rule 606(b) generally bars juror testimony about deliberations, including lying in voir dire)
- McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (test for when a juror’s failure to answer honestly on voir dire warrants new trial)
- Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (requires inquiry/hearing when credible allegation of juror bias arises)
- Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (no‑impeachment rule limits post‑verdict inquiry into jury deliberations)
- Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (Batson principles apply in civil cases to forbid race‑based exclusion of jurors)