22 F.4th 397
3d Cir.2022Background
- Karlie Hall, a Millersville University student, had an abusive relationship with non-student boyfriend Gregorio Orrostieta while living in Bard Hall; incidents occurred in Sept–Oct 2014 and again in Feb 2015.
- On Oct 4–5, 2014 RA Sara Wiberg heard disturbance, saw signs of injury, had Orrostieta removed, and prepared an incident report that was received by Millersville officials but not forwarded to the Title IX Coordinator.
- Karlie exhibited withdrawal after the October incident (missed class, rarely left her room); Millersville personnel and Karlie’s friend’s mother placed calls reporting the abuse but were told nothing could be done without a complaining witness.
- On Feb 7, 2015 Orrostieta killed Karlie in her dorm; he was later convicted of third-degree murder.
- Millersville had Title IX and guest policies that covered visitors/third parties, a power to issue no-trespass orders, and a Title IX reporting structure that its deputies failed to follow.
- Procedural posture: District Court granted Millersville summary judgment for lack of notice but found genuine factual disputes on Title IX elements; Third Circuit reversed on the notice issue but affirmed that material factual disputes preclude summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Millersville had adequate notice it could be liable under Title IX for deliberate indifference to harassment by a non‑student guest | Davis and Title IX text allow damages when recipient knowingly remains deliberately indifferent and has control over harasser/context; Millersville’s policy covers visitors | No court has extended Title IX damages to student non‑student guest harassment; guidance contemplates only school‑invited third parties | Court: Title IX and Davis give sufficient notice that recipients may be liable where they have substantial control and are deliberately indifferent; District Court erred to hold no notice |
| Whether Millersville exercised substantial control over the harasser and the harassment context | Guest policies, prior removals, and ability to issue no‑trespass orders show control over Orrostieta and dorm context | Non‑student status precludes disciplinary authority; dorm room is private context outside school control | Genuine dispute of material fact exists as to control — summary judgment inappropriate |
| Whether appropriate Millersville officials had actual notice of harassment | RA’s incident report reached Deputy Title IX and Area Coordinator; mother’s calls reported visible injury — could put officials on notice | No actionable report to Title IX Coordinator; officials told callers nothing could be done without a complaining witness | Genuine dispute exists whether appropriate officials had actual knowledge — jury question |
| Whether Millersville’s response was deliberately indifferent and whether harassment was severe enough to deny educational benefits | Officials failed to follow Title IX policy, did not contact Karlie, delayed police reporting — could be clearly unreasonable; Karlie missed class and ultimately was killed | Nightly removal addressed immediate danger; inaction was negligence or bureaucratic error, not deliberate indifference; causation is lacking | Genuine factual dispute on deliberate indifference and severity — summary judgment improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (Title IX damages available only where recipient had actual notice and was deliberately indifferent)
- Davis ex rel. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (recipient liable only when it has substantial control over harasser and context and is deliberately indifferent)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (Title IX implies private right for intentional misconduct such as retaliation; text can supply notice)
- Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (monetary damages available under Title IX)
- Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (spending‑clause statutes are contractual; recipients must have notice of conditions)
- Simpson v. Univ. of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007) (third‑party/nonstudent harassment can fall within Title IX when school control and notice conditions are met)