John E. Matlock v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
2016 SC 000066
| Ky. | Feb 14, 2017Background
- Early morning deputies responded to a report of a suspicious person (Bowles) at a double-wide trailer; Bowles sat on a bicycle in front of the trailer and said he and his girlfriend came to pick up belongings.
- Deputy Richerson approached, knocked on the trailer door, then went to a nearby pre-fab storage shed (about 10 feet behind the trailer) after being told someone might be inside.
- Inside the shed were three people: Brittany Peay, Melissa Tishner, and John Matlock; when the door opened Richerson smelled a strong chemical odor associated with methamphetamine.
- Matlock objected to entry; deputies awakened the property owner, Jason Borden, who consented to a search; officers found meth lab materials and arrested Matlock for first-degree manufacturing and PFO.
- Matlock moved to suppress the evidence, arguing (1) he had standing to challenge the search as a resident/tenant and (2) Borden could not validly consent; the trial court denied suppression and found Matlock lacked standing to assert curtilage rights and that officers reasonably relied on Borden’s consent.
- The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Matlock lacked standing to invoke Borden’s curtilage rights, the officers’ knock-and-talk was lawful, and Borden’s consent was valid under a reasonable belief of common authority.
Issues
| Issue | Matlock's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge search/curtilage | Matlock contended he was a tenant of the shed (or had access to the main trailer) and thus had a legitimate expectation of privacy to challenge the search | The Commonwealth argued Matlock lacked an expectation of privacy in Borden’s home/curtilage; curtilage rights belong to the owner or to someone with privacy in the home | Court: Matlock lacked standing to assert Borden’s curtilage rights; record did not support that Matlock had Fourth Amendment rights in the main residence or as a tenant in a way that would permit him to assert curtilage claims |
| Lawfulness of approaching/knock-and-talk | Matlock asserted the shed’s location and hour made the officer’s presence unreasonable and invaded curtilage | Commonwealth argued approach to residence and shed for investigation was lawful; knock-and-talk is permitted | Court: Deputy Richerson’s approach and knock-and-talk were reasonable and lawful under Kentucky precedents |
| Validity of owner’s consent to search | Matlock argued that if the shed was his independent residence, Borden (landlord/owner) could not consent to search | Commonwealth argued Borden had common authority or officers reasonably believed he did and thus consent was valid | Court: Consent was valid; even if Borden lacked actual authority, officers reasonably believed he had common authority (Illinois v. Rodriguez doctrine) |
| Suppression remedy asserted for constitutional violation | Matlock sought suppression of meth evidence due to alleged Fourth Amendment violation | Commonwealth maintained search exceptions applied (consent; lawful approach) so suppression was improper | Court: Suppression was properly denied; convictions affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Leon, 486 U.S. 897 (warrant exception and exclusionary-rule discussion)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (two-part test for reasonable expectation of privacy)
- Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (standing/expectation of privacy analysis)
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (review standard for search reasonableness)
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (curtilage factors)
- Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (curtilage and open-field distinctions)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (consent as exception to warrant requirement)
- United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (common authority to consent)
- Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (valid consent where officers reasonably believe third party has common authority)
- Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (limits on third-party consent searches)