29 F.4th 675
11th Cir.2022Background
- John Doe, a male Samford University student, was accused by Jane Roe of being incapacitated and sexually assaulted after leaving a party; Roe later filed a Title IX complaint.
- The university investigator (her first Title IX investigation) produced a report with witness statements (some contradicting Roe), and the hearing panel credited Roe and suspended Doe for five years.
- Doe alleged multiple procedural defects: lack of pre-interview written notice, an inexperienced investigator, allegedly prejudicial hearsay and unredacted witness statements in the investigative report, and the appeal panel’s refusal to credit certain medical evidence and testimony.
- Doe sued under Title IX asserting sex discrimination via an "erroneous outcome" theory and a "selective enforcement" theory; he also sought to proceed pseudonymously.
- The district court dismissed the Title IX and state-law claims for failure to plausibly allege discrimination on the basis of sex; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding Doe’s allegations insufficient to permit a reasonable inference of sex-based discrimination and dismissing the pseudonym appeal as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Doe pleaded a Title IX violation (discrimination "on the basis of sex") | Doe: procedural flaws, investigator/hearing bias, public pressure, and campus Clery statistics support plausible inference of anti-male bias (erroneous outcome and selective enforcement theories). | Samford: plaintiff must plead facts allowing a reasonable inference that the university acted on the basis of sex; alleged facts are conclusory or equally (or more) explained by sex-neutral reasons (inexperience, pro-complainant bias). | Affirmed dismissal: allegations do not permit a reasonable inference of discrimination on the basis of sex; Yusuf theories fail for lack of particularized facts and comparator evidence. |
| Whether Doe may proceed under pseudonym | Doe: anonymity needed; district court denied pseudonym motion. | University did not oppose limited sealing but opposed pseudonym request. | Moot: dismissal of substantive claims leaves no live controversy, so appeal of denial of pseudonymity is dismissed as moot. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (articulates pleading plausibility standard under Rule 8)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must allege factual content permitting plausible entitlement to relief)
- Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994) (describes "erroneous outcome" and "selective enforcement" theories in school-discipline Title IX suits)
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (recognizes implied private right of action under Title IX and limits on liability)
- Doe v. Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2018) (discusses Title IX framework in university disciplinary context)
- Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019) (adopts test asking whether alleged facts permit plausible inference of discrimination "on the basis of sex")