John Doe v. Kamala Harris, 772 F.3d 563

Background

CASE Act adds to California sex offender registration by requiring lists of Internet identifiers and ISPs, plus 24‑hour notice of changes.
Doe, Roe, and CASE (nonprofit) sue alleging First Amendment violations; district court grants preliminary injunction.
District court adopts narrowing constructions for ‘Internet identifier’ and ‘Internet service provider’ but finds the Act not narrowly tailored.
State and proponents appeal; issue is whether the Act burdens protected speech and is justified under First Amendment scrutiny.
Court applies intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral, speech-burdening regulation and weighs irreparable harm and public interest.
Court affirms the district court’s injunction, holding the CASE Act likely burdens protected speech and is not narrowly tailored.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the CASE Act burden protected speech under the First Amendment?	Doe argues the Act chills anonymous online speech and burdens speech.	California contends the Act regulates conduct of a class and not speech, with legitimate interests.	Yes; the Act burdened protected speech and triggered First Amendment scrutiny.
What level of scrutiny applies to the CASE Act?	Scrutiny should be strict because it singles out speakers.	Law is content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny.	Intermediate scrutiny applies; the Act is content-neutral but burdens speech.
Is the CASE Act narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest?	Ambiguities and overbreadth chill speech, with insufficient tailoring.	Act furthers combating human trafficking and online exploitation with some tailoring.	No; ambiguities and broad, potentially overbroad disclosure chill protected speech.
Do ambiguities in reporting requirements undermine tailoring and chill speech?	Ambiguities lead to over- or under-reporting and confusion.	Ambiguities could be clarified through enforcement.	Yes; ambiguities contribute to chilling effects and undermine tailoring.
Do public disclosure provisions adequately constrain law enforcement's use of Internet identifiers?	Disclosures to the public lack limiting standards, risking harassment and chilling speech.	Existing safeguards and discretion limit misuse.	No; lack of objective standards for ‘necessary to ensure public safety’ gives unbridled discretion.
Does the 24-hour reporting requirement unduly burden First Amendment activity?	Rapid reporting requirement is onerous and deters online speech.	Registration updates are reasonable regulatory requirements.	Yes; 24-hour requirement is onerous and overbroad, chilling protected speech.

Key Cases Cited

Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1983) (content-neutral restrictions burdening speech may require scrutiny similar to speech)
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (U.S. 1965) (affirmative obligations can deter speech and violate First Amendment)
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (U.S. 1986) (distinguishes between enforcement against unlawful conduct and speech)
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (U.S. 1994) (content-neutral restrictions may be upheld under intermediate scrutiny if not suppressing speech)
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (U.S. 1989) (content neutrality and tailoring standard for speech regulations)
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334 (U.S. 1995) (anonymity is a core First Amendment protection)
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (U.S. 2011) (speech restrictions based on speaker identity trigger strict scrutiny)
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (U.S. 1997) (online speech protection; First Amendment scope on the Internet)
Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1998) (sex offender registration as collateral consequence, not punishment)
Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2010) (content-neutral regulation subject to intermediate scrutiny)