John Doe v. 1, 16-6026

North Carolina requires registration for certain sex offenses and, for "restricted sex offenders" (violent offenses or offenses with victims under 16), prohibits knowingly being at specified locations (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14‑208.18(a) (2015)), including (1) places intended primarily for minors, (2) within 300 feet of such places when on non‑primarily‑minor premises (e.g., malls), and (3) places where minors "gather for regularly scheduled" programs.
Five "Does" (restricted registrants) sued state officials under § 1983 challenging subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) as overbroad (First Amendment) and vague (Due Process); the district court invalidated (a)(2) and (a)(3) and enjoined enforcement.
The district court held (a)(3) unconstitutionally vague because "regularly scheduled" and "where minors gather" give no principled standards and contain no illustrative examples, making fair notice and enforcement impossible.
The district court held (a)(2) facially overbroad because it bars access to many places associated with First Amendment activity without considering individual dangerousness (i.e., it applies to all restricted offenders, including those with only adult‑victim histories).
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed: it upheld the vagueness ruling as to (a)(3) and affirmed that the State failed to carry its burden under intermediate scrutiny to justify (a)(2), due largely to lack of empirical evidence tying adult‑victim offenders to risk to minors.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 14‑208.18(a)(3) is unconstitutionally vague	(Does) Language "regularly scheduled" and "where minors gather" are indeterminate; no examples or standards; gives no fair notice	(State) Read in pari materia with (a)(1) and (a)(2); statute has a clear core meaning when read together	Court: (a)(3) is unconstitutionally vague; cannot be saved by importing examples from adjacent subsections; affirmed district court
Whether § 14‑208.18(a)(2) is facially overbroad under the First Amendment	(Does) (a)(2) restricts access to many forums for protected activity and does not account for individual dangerousness; burdens substantially more speech than necessary	(State) Statute is content‑neutral, serves substantial interest in protecting minors, and is justified by common sense, case examples, and public safety needs	Court: Apply intermediate scrutiny; State bore burden to show fit and tailored means but produced insufficient empirical evidence; (a)(2) facially overbroad as applied to all restricted offenders; affirmed district court

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (statute must provide a standard of conduct; distinguishing imprecise but comprehensible norms from no standard at all)
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (statutes may have a constitutional "core" even if marginal applications are close questions)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (criminal statutes must give fair notice and not encourage arbitrary enforcement)
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (intermediate scrutiny for content‑neutral time, place, and manner regulations requires narrow tailoring)
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (overbreadth requires real and substantial burden on protected speech)
Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (facial overbreadth requires realistic danger of chilling protected expression)
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (government must produce evidence to show that challenged restrictions are necessary to serve important interests)
United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir.) (use of empirical evidence to support regulatory fit in another context)
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir.) (government bears burden to show the required fit under intermediate scrutiny)