John Doe I v. Nestle, USA
738 F.3d 1048
9th Cir.2013Background
- Plaintiffs appealed dismissal of their First Amended Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) asserting Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claims based on aiding and abetting international-law violations.
- The district court required a specific-intent ("purpose") mens rea for aiding-and-abetting liability under international law and applied precedent (including Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy).
- The appellate panel concluded intervening authority affects two issues: corporate liability under the ATS and the correct actus reus standard for aiding and abetting.
- The panel held corporations can face ATS liability in light of post-Sosa decisions and circuit authority recognizing corporate ATS claims.
- The panel rejected the district court’s requirement that plaintiffs plead specific intent (equating purpose with specific intent) as necessary under the applicable mens rea standard and found errors in the district court’s aiding-and-abetting actus reus analysis.
- The panel vacated the district court’s order and remanded, granting leave to amend the complaint to address extraterritoriality and aiding-and-abetting actus reus issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether corporations can be liable under the ATS | Corporations may be liable under ATS for aiding and abetting international-law violations | Corporations argued they are not subject to ATS liability (or district court treated corporate liability as barred) | Panel held corporations can face ATS liability in light of intervening authority and circuit precedent |
| Required mens rea for aiding and abetting under international law | Plaintiffs argued knowledge/purpose standard suffices (as applied by district court) | Defendants urged a specific-intent standard (purpose to facilitate the crime) | Panel found the district court erred in rigidly requiring pleading of specific intent and did not impose that strict standard on remand |
| Actus reus standard for aiding and abetting | Plaintiffs contended substantial assistance is the operative actus reus (not necessarily specific direction) | Defendants argued specific direction or precise form of assistance must be alleged | Panel clarified actus reus is satisfied by assistance that has a substantial effect on the crimes and noted varying tribunal approaches to specific direction; remanded to allow amendment |
| Relief / procedural disposition | Plaintiffs sought reversal and leave to amend | Defendants sought dismissal to stand | Court vacated dismissal, remanded for further proceedings, and granted leave to amend |
Key Cases Cited
- Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (limiting ATS causes of action to norms of international character defined with care)
- Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) (articulating purpose/specific-intent standard for aiding and abetting)
- Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding corporations may be liable under the ATS)
- Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (addressing corporate ATS liability)
- Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011) (same)
- Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2011) (adopting specific-intent standard for accessorial liability)
- United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing equivalence of "purpose" and specific intent)