John Doe Co. No. 1 v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 195 F. Supp. 3d 9

Background

Plaintiffs (several companies and individuals) sued to enjoin the CFPB from interviewing a former attorney; they sought confidential treatment and to proceed under pseudonyms (John Does).
Acting Chief Judge Sullivan initially granted a temporary sealing order; the district court later denied sealing the entire case but permitted pseudonymous treatment and redactions of identifying information.
The CFPB moved for reconsideration, arguing the court applied the wrong legal test (Hubbard) and should instead use factors like those in Teti; it also sought clarification about obligations under FOIA with respect to CFPB filings.
Plaintiffs argued the CFPB’s reconsideration was untimely and defended the need for anonymity to avoid reputational and economic harm from disclosure of an ongoing investigation.
The district court held a full briefing and oral argument, assessed competing public-interest and privacy considerations, and examined sworn declarations about likely economic harm to plaintiffs if identities were revealed.
The court denied the CFPB’s motion for reconsideration, reaffirming continued pseudonymous treatment while the CFPB investigation remains ongoing and declined to resolve the FOIA question as not ripe.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of CFPB's motion for reconsideration	CFPB’s motion is governed by Rule 60 and is untimely (brought after a presumptive 3-month cutoff)	CFPB contends court has supervisory power over records and may revisit sealing at any time	Motion was timely; 87-day delay not disqualifying given continuing equitable relief nature
Appropriate standard of review for reconsideration	Motion should be judged under Rule 60(b) (extraordinary circumstances)	CFPB treats it as exercise of supervisory power (de novo review)	Court did not settle a single standard but found that even under de novo review continued pseudonymity is warranted
Whether Hubbard (seal factors) or Teti (pseudonymity factors) controls	Plaintiffs relied on Hubbard factors used for sealing and privacy balance	CFPB argued Teti-type factors specifically govern pseudonymity decisions	Court applied Hubbard-style balancing; held Teti factors add little here and Hubbard-style analysis is appropriate
Whether plaintiffs’ privacy interests outweigh public right to know identities	Plaintiffs: disclosure of an ongoing CFPB investigation would cause severe reputational and financial harm; pseudonymity needed	CFPB: investigations often non-public but not categorically; some agency rules and practices permit disclosure; public interest in transparency outweighs secrecy	Held for plaintiffs: substantial privacy interest shown (supported by a detailed declaration for key plaintiff); pseudonymous treatment appropriate while investigation is ongoing; FOIA clarification deferred

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (articulates multi-factor test for sealing/judicial-privacy balancing)
In re Sealed Case, 237 F.3d 657 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (recognizes strong presumption favoring sealing the existence of certain enforcement proceedings)
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (U.S. 1978) (courts have supervisory power over their records but public access is presumptive)
Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 749 F.3d 246 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discusses First Amendment right of access and limits on pseudonymous litigation)
United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (U.S. 1983) (grand jury secrecy protects accused persons from public ridicule and preserves investigatory confidentiality)
Salazar v. District of Columbia, 633 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (timeliness of Rule 60 motions assessed by delay length, reasons, and prejudice)
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (U.S. 1950) (discusses standards for reopening final orders and extraordinary-circumstances requirement)