John Armstrong v. Edmund Brown, Jr., 768 F.3d 975

Plaintiffs are a certified class of disabled California prisoners and parolees who sued state corrections officials in 1994 under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act for systemic failure to provide disability accommodations.
The district court approved a remedial plan and entered a permanent injunction in 2001; after continued noncompliance it entered a 2007 injunction requiring an accountability system to track institutional and staff noncompliance.
The State implemented a 2008 memorandum establishing investigation and logging procedures (the "2008 Memo") but allegedly logged only certain findings and often delayed or failed to investigate complaints.
In 2012 Plaintiffs moved for contempt; the district court declined to hold the State in contempt but issued a Modified Injunction clarifying that the State must investigate and log all allegations of noncompliance, produce monthly logs and investigation reports to Plaintiffs’ counsel, and adopt certain dispute-resolution procedures, including use of a court-appointed expert under Rule 706.
The State appealed, raising procedural notice, PLRA, scope (statewide) and authority-to-delegate (expert) challenges; the Ninth Circuit affirmed most of the Modified Injunction but vacated the provisions that gave the Rule 706 expert final adjudicative authority.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether court properly modified injunction without additional notice/hearing	Modification was appropriate after contempt motion; State had chance to respond	Modification was procedurally improper because it followed a contempt motion and lacked adequate notice	Modification provided sufficient notice/opportunity; affirmed
Whether State waived challenges to statewide scope and conflicts with state law/CBA	Plaintiffs argued nationwide/systemwide relief appropriate given systemic failures	State argued injunction overbroad and conflicted with state law/CBA	State waived those arguments by not raising them below; court declined to address them on appeal
Whether Modified Injunction violates PLRA (overbroad/micro-manages)	Modified logging/investigation narrowly tailored to correct accountability failures	State argued PLRA bars such intrusive, systemwide relief	Court held modification comports with PLRA given history of failures; affirmed
Whether Rule 706 expert may make final, binding determinations on compliance	Plaintiffs supported expert dispute-resolution power to ensure accountability	State argued delegation to expert improperly usurped judicial role	Sections delegating final adjudicative authority to expert vacated and remanded for revision; expert may only make recommendations subject to court review

Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming remedial plan and discussing limits of court involvement in prison administration)
Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing PLRA constraints and injunction scope)
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (approving use of a technical advisor whose findings did not displace the court)
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (recognizing broad equitable power of district courts in prison reform contexts)
O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (warning against court orders requiring continuous federal supervision of state officers)
Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 378 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding intrusive relief where longstanding systemic failures persisted)
Clement v. California Dept. of Corrs., 364 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2004) (district court may sua sponte modify injunctive relief in prison cases)
San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing Rule 706 expert roles in complex technical litigation)