Joel Flores, Individually and in a Representative Capacity and Criselda Flores, Individually and in a Representative Capacity v. Gonzalez & Associates Law Firm, Ltd.
13-15-00205-CV
| Tex. App. | Dec 18, 2015Background
- Joel and Criselda Flores (Ms. Flores is an experienced attorney) retained González & Associates under a contingent-fee contract to prosecute a wrongful-death claim; contract provided tiered fees (25% if settled early, 31% if later).
- González investigated, filed suit, hired experts, and negotiated a Rule 11 settlement ($6,250,000 total benefits, including $6,000,000 insurance proceeds and a public apology/ceremony) which the Flores accepted and publicly participated in.
- Months after accepting settlement, Flores discharged González and refused to pay the agreed fee; they sued González asserting tort claims (breach of fiduciary duty, fraud) seeking disgorgement rather than suing on the contract.
- González intervened to enforce the fee contract and sought attorney’s fees; it moved for traditional and no‑evidence summary judgment on the Flores’ tort claims.
- The trial court granted summary judgment on the tort claims, excluded evidence of a “good cause” defense (because Flores failed to plead it timely, made judicial admissions, and tendered a 25% fee), denied late motions to amend pleadings, held a bench trial on the contract claim, and awarded González contract recovery plus attorney’s fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment on breach of fiduciary duty was proper | Flores argued Gonzalez breached fiduciary duties and sought disgorgement; factual disputes exist | Gonzalez argued Flores produced no competent evidence of breach or damages and many allegations lack personal knowledge or are immaterial | Court affirmed: no‑evidence and traditional SJ proper—Flores failed to raise more than a scintilla and showed no harm or benefit to Gonzalez |
| Whether evidence of "good cause" for discharge should have been admitted | Flores sought to present "good cause" as avoidance defense to the fee contract | Gonzalez argued Flores failed to timely plead the affirmative defense, failed to deny conditions precedent, made judicial admissions abandoning it, and tendered 25% fee | Court affirmed exclusion: defense untimely, foreclosed by pleadings/admissions, and rendered moot by the tender |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by denying leave to amend to add contract claim/defense | Flores argued they should be allowed to amend to plead breach of contract and good‑cause defense after SJ loss | Gonzalez argued amendment was untimely, prejudicial and would cause surprise given frozen deadlines and prior admissions | Court affirmed denial: amendments prejudicial on their face and would cause surprise; pleadings/deadlines were frozen |
| Whether attorney’s fees award and nonsegregation were proper; whether Arthur Andersen factors met | Flores argued fees should be segregated and expert proof insufficient under Arthur Andersen | Gonzalez presented uncontradicted expert testimony on reasonableness and necessity; fees related to intertwined claims and sanctions motion (a motion, not separate cause) | Court affirmed: award not an abuse of discretion; no segregation required; uncontroverted expert testimony satisfied fee factors |
Key Cases Cited
- Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999) (fee forfeiture for attorney breach is limited to clear, serious disloyalty and presumes injury only for certain breaches)
- Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997) (factors for reasonableness of attorneys' fees)
- Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006) (segregation principle for recoverable vs. nonrecoverable attorney fees)
- Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1990) (uncontroverted expert testimony on fees may be accepted as true)
- Lindley v. McKnight, 349 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011) (summary judgment no‑evidence / need for competent, nonconclusory evidence)