156 N.E.3d 718
Ind. Ct. App.2020Background
- December 16, 2018: multi-vehicle crash in South Bend; Barrozo fled the scene after driving a Dodge Avenger that struck a Nissan, which then struck a Thunderbird. Three people ultimately died and others were seriously injured.
- Barrozo identified as Avenger driver; State charged multiple counts including three counts Level 5 reckless homicide, two Class A misdemeanor reckless driving, and leaving the scene counts.
- Barrozo pleaded guilty without a plea agreement; at sentencing the court entered convictions for three Level 5 reckless homicides (5 years each), two Class A reckless driving (1 year each), and one Class A leaving-the-scene (1 year); other counts were not entered due to double jeopardy concerns.
- Trial court ordered consecutive terms for an 18-year aggregate sentence.
- On appeal the State conceded one reckless driving conviction must be vacated; the Court of Appeals agreed and remanded to vacate one reckless driving conviction and resentence; all other convictions affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether convictions for reckless homicide, reckless driving, and leaving-the-scene violate double jeopardy when one act implicates multiple statutes | Statutes do not clearly permit multiple punishment; under included-offense analysis the offenses are not included offenses of one another | Overlap between offenses (e.g., injury/death) makes convictions cumulative and barred by double jeopardy | None are statutory included offenses; no double jeopardy violation as to the trio of different statutes |
| Whether multiple reckless-homicide convictions for multiple victims violate double jeopardy (unit-of-prosecution) | Unit of prosecution is each killing; multiple deaths = multiple offenses | Single incident cannot be fragmented into multiple homicides | Unit is the resulting death; three convictions upheld |
| Whether multiple reckless-driving convictions (multiple victims) violate double jeopardy (unit-of-prosecution) | Crime is completed by the single act of reckless driving; statute lacks text authorizing separate convictions per victim | Multiple victims support separate convictions | Unit of prosecution is the single act of reckless driving; multiple convictions not permitted — remand to vacate one conviction and resentence |
| Procedural: appropriateness of raising double jeopardy on direct appeal after guilty plea | State: such claims ordinarily belong in post-conviction relief but court may address plain legal error | Barrozo: raised claim on direct appeal | Court exercised discretion to address the claim on the merits despite plea posture |
Key Cases Cited
- Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999) (prior Indiana double jeopardy framework referenced and later overruled)
- Paquette v. State, 101 N.E.3d 234 (Ind. 2018) (statutory structure can indicate whether enhancements create separate offenses)
- Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. 2006) (distinguishing conduct-based and result-based statutes)
- Rentz v. United States, 777 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2015) (unit-of-prosecution analysis centers on the statute’s verb and required act)
- Shrader v. United States, 675 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2012) (victim-focused unit-of-prosecution analysis under a victim-specific statute)
- Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35 (Ind. 2004) (guilty-plea challenges ordinarily addressed via post-conviction relief)
- Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 2002) (similar procedural guidance on challenges after guilty plea)