Joe Smith v. Charles Ryan
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9641
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Joseph Clarence Smith, Jr. was convicted in the 1970s of two murders (Sandy Spencer and Neva Lee) and sentenced to death; prior habeas review (Smith v. Stewart) led to resentencing in 2004 under an updated Arizona procedure.
- Resentencings used jury finding of statutory aggravators (E)(1), (E)(2), and (E)(6); both juries unanimously found the aggravators and returned death verdicts.
- Defense presented mitigation evidence including expert testimony diagnosing sexual sadism and mental impairment; prosecution presented extensive rebuttal evidence recounting prior rapes and the murders.
- Smith raised numerous federal habeas claims (confrontation clause re: autopsy hearsay; due process/Eighth/Ex Post Facto challenges to prosecution rebuttal evidence; vagueness challenges to (E)(2) and (E)(6); ineffective assistance for failing to obtain PET/DTI scans). District court denied relief; COA granted on some claims.
- The Ninth Circuit applied AEDPA deference and affirmed the denial of habeas relief, rejecting Smith’s Confrontation, Due Process, Eighth Amendment, Ex Post Facto, vagueness, and ineffective-assistance claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Smith) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Confrontation clause (admission of autopsy-related hearsay at sentencing) | Admission of testimonial out-of-court autopsy statements violated Sixth Amendment | No clearly established Supreme Court rule extends Confrontation Clause to sentencing; Williams controls | Denied — claim foreclosed by Williams; Arizona Supreme Court not unreasonable |
| Rebuttal evidence (admission of graphic prior-crime details) — Due Process / Eighth / Ex Post Facto | Rebuttal evidence was inflammatory, effectively nonstatutory aggravation, violated fundamental fairness, Eighth Amendment, and Ex Post Facto Clause | Rebuttal was proper to counter mitigation (sexual sadism); Arizona law permits broad penalty-phase evidence; any statutory change was procedural | Denied — evidence relevant to rebuttal; not fundamentally unfair; Eighth and Ex Post Facto claims fail under Supreme Court precedent |
| (E)(2) aggravator vagueness (use/prior felony involving violence) | Arizona’s (E)(2) is unconstitutionally vague when applied; treating any first-degree murder as violent fails to narrow sentencing discretion | Arizona courts narrowly construe (E)(2) to focus on elements of prior conviction and define ‘‘violence’’ as physical force to injure or abuse; applied here | Denied — Arizona’s narrowing construction applied; not arbitrary or capricious under Jeffers/AEDPA review |
| (E)(6) aggravator vagueness (especially heinous, cruel, or depraved) | (E)(6) fails to channel sentencer discretion, and Ring’s jury-factfinder rule undermines prior approvals of Arizona’s narrowing instructions | Arizona’s jury instructions mirror narrowing constructions approved in Walton, Jeffers, Richmond; Ring does not clearly require overruling those decisions for AEDPA purposes | Denied — instructions consistent with Supreme Court precedent; Ring does not clearly establish error |
| Ineffective assistance (failure to obtain PET/DTI scans at resentencing) | Counsel should have obtained scans showing organic brain damage; prejudice would have altered penalty outcome | Scans were cumulative of existing expert testimony; many experts examined Smith with no prior finding of organic damage; overwhelming prosecution evidence defeats prejudice | Denied — claim procedurally defaulted; not substantial under Martinez/Strickland; no prejudice shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (court may consider unconfronted statements at sentencing)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (jury must find facts necessary for death penalty) (contextual to resentencing procedure change)
- Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (Arizona’s (E)(6) narrowing instruction constitutional)
- Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (requirement that aggravators be narrowed to channel sentencer discretion)
- Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (approval of Arizona’s narrowing constructions for (E)(6))
- Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (statutory aggravators circumscribe death-eligible class; jury may consider other factors at selection)
- Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (Eighth Amendment does not bar consideration of criminal record in sentencing)
- Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (distinguishing admissibility rules from substantive changes triggering Ex Post Facto concerns)
- Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (invalidating vague aggravator absent narrowing instruction)
- Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (invalidating vague aggravator)
- Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (state entitled to rebut mitigation with its own proof)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (AEDPA deference and standard for unreasonable application)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (when ineffective-assistance claims in initial-review collateral proceedings may excuse procedural default)
- Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (Ninth Circuit application of Martinez/Dickens framework)