974 F.3d 638
6th Cir.2020Background
- In 1986 Mitchell (Black) was convicted by an all‑white jury of rapes of two white women; the prosecutor used a peremptory strike to remove Black venireperson Hattie Alderson.\
- Trial counsel did not raise a Batson challenge at trial or on direct appeal; post‑conviction counsel (Runde) filed a petition raising multiple IAC claims but did not properly develop or timely present a Batson / IAC‑Batson claim at the state post‑conviction hearing.\
- The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief, citing a lack of evidence in the record to evaluate a Batson claim. Mitchell then sought federal habeas relief; a 1994 federal evidentiary hearing found a Batson violation and the district court granted relief.\
- The Sixth Circuit reversed multiple times, treating Mitchell’s failure to develop the Batson/IAC‑Batson record as a procedural default requiring cause under pre‑AEDPA doctrine (Keeney/Coleman), and concluding Mitchell had not shown cause. Those reversals were later criticized or limited by subsequent precedent.\
- After the Supreme Court decided Martinez (2012) and Trevino (2013) (excusing certain procedural defaults when initial collateral counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial‑IAC claims), Mitchell moved under Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen his pre‑AEDPA habeas and apply Martinez. The district court denied relief; this appeal followed.\
- The Sixth Circuit (Stranch, J.) held Martinez applies to Mitchell’s pre‑AEDPA, failure‑to‑develop IAC‑Batson claim, found extraordinary circumstances for Rule 60(b)(6) relief, reversed the district court, granted a conditional writ, and remanded with 180 days for the State to retry or release Mitchell.
Issues
| Issue | Mitchell's Argument | Warden's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez/Trevino govern a pre‑AEDPA, failure‑to‑develop IAC‑Batson claim | Martinez applies; post‑conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness provides cause to excuse default and the underlying IAC‑Batson has some merit | Sixth Circuit precedent (West/Moore) and state appellate language mean the claim was decided on the merits or otherwise not within Martinez | Martinez applies — Mitchell’s IAC‑Batson was procedurally defaulted and Martinez can supply cause here (pre‑AEDPA context) |
| Whether the TCCA adjudicated Mitchell’s Batson / IAC‑Batson claims on the merits or denied them for lack of developed evidence (i.e., procedural default) | The TCCA denied relief for lack of evidence and thus did not reach the merits; Mitchell’s failure to develop the issue in state court was a procedural default excused by Martinez | The TCCA’s statement was a merits ruling; prior Sixth Circuit language supports treating it as a merits adjudication, which would bar Martinez relief | The TCCA denied for lack of evidence (not a merits adjudication); the record shows the claim was defaulted for failure to develop facts in state proceedings |
| Whether Mitchell may use Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen his habeas in light of Martinez | Martinez combined with equitable considerations (two successive ineffective lawyers; the severity of racial exclusion) creates extraordinary circumstances warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief | Martinez alone is not extraordinary; Sixth Circuit caselaw limits Rule 60(b)(6)/Martinez relief | Rule 60(b)(6) relief allowed: Martinez can open the door when equitable factors make reconsideration necessary; extraordinary circumstances exist here |
| Appropriate remedy if Martinez + Rule 60(b)(6) apply | Reopen habeas, grant writ or conditional relief (new trial or release) | Relief barred by procedural limits or prior rulings | Grant conditional writ: state must retry within 180 days or release Mitchell; case remanded for proceedings consistent with opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prohibits race‑based peremptory strikes)\
- Keeney v. Tamayo‑Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (cause‑and‑prejudice governs failure to develop state‑court factual record)\
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (attorney negligence in postconviction ordinarily does not excuse procedural default)\
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (ineffective postconviction counsel can establish cause to excuse default of trial‑IAC claims)\
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (extends Martinez to systems denying meaningful opportunity to raise trial‑IAC on direct appeal)\
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limits federal habeas review under AEDPA to state‑court record)\
- Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (explains Martinez can permit Rule 60(b)(6) equitable relief where grave injustice and public‑confidence concerns exist)\
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (distinguishes Rule 60 motions from successive habeas petitions)\
- Abdur'Rahman v. Bell, 226 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. recognition of district courts’ authority to hold evidentiary hearings pre‑AEDPA)\
- Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631 (discusses district court authority to order evidentiary hearings and revises earlier circuit misinterpretation)\
- Mitchell v. Rees, 114 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 1997) (earlier panel invoking cause requirement; later treated as misapplied to deny relief)