Jodi McClay v. Airport Management Services, LLC, 596 S.W.3d 686

Jodi McClay sued Airport Management Services after injuries at Nashville Airport; a jury awarded $930,000 in noneconomic damages and $444,500 for future medical expenses.
Tennessee law (Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102) caps noneconomic damages at $750,000 (with higher caps for certain catastrophic injuries) and requires the cap be applied by the court, not disclosed to the jury.
Defendant moved to reduce the verdict to the statutory cap; McClay challenged the constitutionality of the cap.
The federal district court certified three questions to the Tennessee Supreme Court under Tenn. R. App. P. 23: whether the cap violates (1) the right to jury trial, (2) separation of powers, and (3) equal protection by disproportionately disadvantaging women.
The Tennessee Supreme Court analyzed legislative authority to alter common law, comparable state and federal precedents, and constitutional standards for jury rights, separation of powers, and equal protection.
The Court answered all three certified questions in the negative and upheld the statutory noneconomic damages cap.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does §29-39-102 violate the right to trial by jury (Art. I, §6)?	McClay: Cap overrides jury’s factual award and thus infringes jury right.	Defendant/State: Jury still decides facts; cap is a legal limit applied by judge after verdict.	No — jury factfinding preserved; cap is a legislative legal limitation applied by the court.
Does §29-39-102 violate separation of powers (Art. II)?	McClay: Legislature’s cap improperly intrudes on judicial function to set remedies.	Defendant/State: Cap is substantive legislation; courts retain power to apply law and adjudicate facts.	No — cap is a substantive legislative change within authority; courts apply it as law.
Does §29-39-102 violate equal protection by disproportionately harming women?	McClay: Cap has disparate impact on women’s damages (no showing of discriminatory intent).	Defendant/State: Statute is facially neutral; disparate impact alone insufficient without proof of intent.	No — under federal/Tenn. equal-protection framework, disparate impact without intent does not violate the Constitution.

Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342 (Md. 1992) (upholding noneconomic-damages cap; remedy is matter of law applied after jury verdict)
Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho 2000) (statutory cap limits legal consequences of jury’s factual finding)
Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio 2007) (court may apply statutory cap after jury verdict without violating jury right)
Lavin v. Jordon, 16 S.W.3d 362 (Tenn. 2000) (Legislature may alter common law and limit remedies)
Mills v. Wong, 155 S.W.3d 916 (Tenn. 2005) (General Assembly can change common law within constitutional limits)
Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm’n, 214 S.W.3d 419 (Tenn. 2007) (separation-of-powers framework)
State v. Lowe, 552 S.W.3d 842 (Tenn. 2018) (court’s inherent rulemaking power and limits on legislative intrusion into court procedure)
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (U.S. 1976) (disparate impact alone insufficient for equal-protection violation)
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (U.S. 1977) (proof of discriminatory intent required for constitutional violation)
Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (U.S. 1979) (Equal Protection guarantees equal laws, not equal results)