Joanne Cote v. Derby Insurance Agency, Inc., an Iowa Corporation, and Kevin Dorn, Individually
16-0558
| Iowa Ct. App. | Aug 2, 2017Background
- Joanne Cote worked at Derby Insurance Agency from 1998–2014 and alleged long‑running sexual harassment by Kevin Dorn, culminating in claims filed with the ICRC (April 2013) and suit in district court (April 2014).
- Cote describes a pattern since 2005 of Dorn exposing himself to female employees and to Cote starting in 2007, including occasions in 2011–2012; she says the conduct stopped about August 1, 2012.
- Derby (an S‑corporation owned by Patricia Dorn, Kevin’s wife) moved for summary judgment arguing: the ICRA’s <4‑employee exemption applies (counting family members); Cote’s claims are time‑barred; tort claims are preempted by the ICRA; and the torts lack necessary facts.
- The district court denied summary judgment except as to tort events before April 7, 2012; Derby appealed interlocutorily.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed in part (ICRA applicability; hostile‑work‑environment and IIED survive), reversed in part (assault claim dismissed), and declined to decide preemption on interlocutory review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the ICRA family‑member exclusion permit counting family of a corporate employer when determining the <4‑employee exemption? | Cote: a corporation cannot have "family members" for purposes of the exclusion; thus Derby is subject to the ICRA. | Derby: "employer" and "person" definitions include corporations; the exclusion should extend to family of corporate owners. | The phrase is ambiguous but read in context to mean a natural person; corporations cannot be treated as having family members for the exclusion, so Derby is subject to the ICRA. |
| Are Cote’s ICRA and tort claims time‑barred? | Cote: hostile‑work‑environment is a continuing violation; acts within the limitations period (to early Aug 2012) bring the claim timely. | Derby: no actionable discriminatory act occurred within the 300‑day (ICRA) or two‑year (tort) windows—only speculation that Dorn repeated conduct in June–July 2012. | Court: viewing facts in plaintiff’s favor, Cote produced sufficient evidence of repeated conduct continuing into the limitations period; hostile‑work‑environment and post‑April 7, 2012 tort claims survive. |
| Are Cote’s common‑law tort claims preempted by the ICRA? | Cote: preemption not addressed/waived; torts are distinct. | Derby: tort claims are not separate and independent and therefore preempted unless they arise independently of discrimination. | Court: declined to decide preemption on interlocutory appeal because preemption is not purely jurisdictional and no final ruling to review. |
| Do factual allegations support IIED and assault at summary judgment? | Cote: repeated exposing/groping pattern was outrageous and caused severe emotional distress; assault arises from conduct near and once accidental contact. | Derby: insufficient undisputed facts—no proving of exposure or immediate feared contact in the limitations period; assault lacks intentional physical contact. | Court: IIED claim survives (outrageousness question for jury); assault fails—summary judgment should have been granted for Dorn on assault. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roll v. Newhall, 888 N.W.2d 422 (Iowa 2016) (summary‑judgment evidentiary standard and view of record for nonmoving party)
- Pippen v. State, 854 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2014) (ICRA construed broadly to effectuate purposes)
- Farmland Foods, Inc. v. Dubuque Human Rights Comm’n, 672 N.W.2d 733 (Iowa 2003) (hostile‑work‑environment is a continuing violation; later acts can make claim timely)
- Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36 (Iowa 1993) (preemption test — torts preempted unless separate and independent from statutory discrimination claim)
- Smith v. Iowa State Univ., 851 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2014) (definition and standard for "outrageous" conduct in IIED)
- Huebner v. MSI Ins. Co., 506 N.W.2d 438 (Iowa 1993) (corporation cannot have "family members" for purposes of insurance policy language)
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (discussion that statutory term "person" may include artificial persons in some contexts)