Joan Opara v. Janet Yellen, 57 F.4th 709

Joan Opara, born 1954 and of Nigerian origin, was a GS-1169-12 IRS Revenue Officer with 27 years’ service.
TIGTA investigated multiple accesses by Opara to taxpayers’ IDRS records (two incidents Feb/Mar 2016 and two July 2016 accesses), and TIGTA documented admissions and conflicting third‑party accounts.
After investigation, Opara’s IDRS access was suspended (standard procedure); she was reassigned to administrative tasks and then proposed for removal for UNAX violations (including a UNAX(e) offense), per the IRS Manager’s Guide.
Territory Manager Frances Miller proposed removal; Paul Alvarado served as hearing official; Dawn Harris (deciding official) terminated Opara on May 11, 2018 after applying Douglas factors and citing evasiveness in TIGTA interview.
Opara’s internal EEO complaint failed (agency found no prima facie discrimination or biased comments corroborated); district court granted the Secretary summary judgment; Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Age discrimination (ADEA) — whether termination motivated by age	Opara says supervisors exaggerated charges, assigned humiliating menial tasks, cited prior ageist remarks by a manager and thus termination was age‑based	IRS: Opara committed UNAX violations; Guide required proposing removal for UNAX(e)/multiple UNAX(c); reassignment pending investigation was standard; alleged age remarks are uncorroborated	Court: Affirmed — record supports employer’s nondiscriminatory reasons; plaintiff failed to show pretext or that age was a motivating factor
National‑origin discrimination (Title VII) — whether termination motivated by national origin	Opara contends assignment to demeaning tasks and harsh penalty reflect bias against non‑Hispanic, non‑white origin; she alleges others would have been allowed to retire	IRS: Same nondiscriminatory grounds (UNAX findings and Guide); retirement is employee choice; no corroborated evidence of biased decisionmaking	Court: Affirmed — even assuming prima facie case, Opara failed to show proffered reasons were false or a pretext for national‑origin discrimination

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (establishes burden‑shifting framework for disparate‑treatment claims)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2000) (plaintiff may combine prima facie case and evidence of falsity to prove discrimination; limits of inference)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1986) (standard for granting summary judgment)
E.E.O.C. v. Boeing Co., 577 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2009) (summary judgment review and burden shifting in discrimination cases)
Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2007) (direct or circumstantial evidence alternative to McDonnell Douglas)
Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2002) (prima facie proof requirement is minimal)
Enlow v. Salem‑Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2004) (definition of direct evidence of discriminatory intent)
Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (McDonnell Douglas factors explained)