Jimmy Weed v. Corporal T.R. Jenkins
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 20225
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- On Aug. 17, 2013, Jimmy Duane Weed protested on a pedestrian overpass above I‑70 in St. Charles, MO, facing highway traffic. Traffic was unusually heavy due to lane closures and a nearby festival exit.
- Five traffic accidents occurred on the highway approach; troopers and a MoDOT worker reported drivers were distracted or making unsafe maneuvers in response to the overpass protesters.
- Corporal T.R. Jenkins, the highest‑ranking MSHP officer present, concluded the protesters were creating a traffic hazard and directed them to disperse; most did but Weed refused.
- Jenkins warned Weed that refusal would result in arrest; Weed remained and was arrested under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 43.170 for willfully opposing a patrol officer.
- Weed sued Jenkins and the MSHP superintendent alleging First and Fourth Amendment violations and attacking § 43.170 as overbroad and void for vagueness; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jenkins’ dispersal order violated the First Amendment | Weed: order unlawfully restricted speech and was void for vagueness | Jenkins: order was a content‑neutral traffic‑safety measure authorized by local ordinance; reasonable under precedent | Qualified immunity: officer entitled to immunity; order was a reasonable, content‑neutral restriction and not clearly unlawful |
| Whether arrest violated Fourth Amendment (probable cause) | Weed: arrest lacked probable cause | Jenkins: had arguable probable cause to arrest under § 43.170 for resisting a proper order | Qualified immunity: arrest supported by arguable probable cause; damages claim barred |
| Whether § 43.170 is facially overbroad under the First Amendment | Weed: statute criminalizes protected speech and grants unfettered discretion | Jenkins: statute targets resisting/opposing officers, not mere speech; analogous statutes upheld | Not overbroad: precedent (McDermott) controls; statute covers physical obstruction/resistance, not mere words |
| Whether § 43.170 is unconstitutionally vague | Weed: statute fails to give fair notice and invites arbitrary enforcement | Jenkins: terms ("willfully resists or opposes") are common words with settled meaning | Not void for vagueness: terms are of common understanding and provide adequate notice |
Key Cases Cited
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework permitting discretion to address clearly established law)
- Frye v. Kansas City Police Dep’t, 375 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2004) (officer entitled to qualified immunity when enforcing content‑neutral restrictions on obstructive protest conduct)
- Stahl v. City of St. Louis, 687 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2012) (addressing constitutional limits on ordinances restricting overpass protests)
- McDermott v. Royal, 613 F.3d 1192 (8th Cir. 2010) (ordinance criminalizing resisting/obstructing officers not overbroad because it targets physical acts, not mere words)
- Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2012) ("arguable probable cause" standard for qualified immunity in arrest cases)
- Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (terms like "obstruct" and "unreasonably interfere" are not unconstitutionally vague)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (personal liability requires personal involvement)