Jimmy Lee Boston v. United States, 939 F.3d 1266

Background

In 2006 Jimmy Lee Boston was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and had numerous prior Florida convictions: two for armed robbery and several listed as "principal to robbery with a firearm" (aiding-and-abetting liability under Fla. Stat. § 777.011).
The district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced Boston to 262 months; Boston did not object to the presentence report or the ACCA enhancement, and direct appeal affirmed.
After Johnson v. United States (invalidating ACCA’s residual clause) and Welch (retroactivity), Boston obtained permission to file a second-or-successive § 2255 motion arguing his principal-to-robbery convictions no longer qualify as ACCA predicates under the elements clause because an aider/abettor may not have committed the force element.
The government argued Boston failed to show his sentence depended on the residual clause and raised procedural-default objections, but chiefly argued he still had at least three violent-felony predicates: two armed-robbery convictions plus one or more principal-to-robbery convictions, and alternatively that some records in fact reflected substantive armed-robbery convictions.
The district court denied relief, finding either four substantive armed-robbery convictions or, in any event, that Florida principal-to-robbery convictions categorically qualify as violent felonies under the elements clause because aiding-and-abetting makes the aider legally responsible for the principal’s acts.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, applying In re Colon and related precedent; Judge Jill Pryor concurred in the judgment but wrote separately expressing doubt about Colon’s reasoning and arguing the rule of lenity should exclude mere aiding-and-abetting from ACCA’s elements-based definition.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Florida convictions for "principal to armed robbery" (aiding/abetting under Fla. Stat. § 777.011) categorically qualify as ACCA "violent felonies" under the elements clause	Boston: A principal conviction can rest on aiding/abetting without proof the defendant personally committed the force element, so such convictions need not satisfy ACCA’s elements clause	Government: Under Florida law an aider/abetor is treated as a principal and therefore is responsible for the principal’s acts; thus principal convictions categorically satisfy the elements clause	Held: Yes. Applying In re Colon and Florida law, the court held principal-to-robbery convictions categorically qualify as violent felonies under the elements clause
Whether two prior Florida judgments that list only the robbery statute (§ 812.13) were substantive armed-robbery convictions independent of § 777.011 aiding/abetting liability	Boston: (Implicitly) these records might reflect only principal-liability convictions and thus raise the same elements-clause problem	Government: The judgments and charging documents establish at least some convictions are substantive armed robbery (or at minimum the principal-liability analysis still makes them ACCA predicates)	Held: Court concluded at least two convictions were substantive armed robberies and, in any event, principal convictions qualify — so Boston had sufficient ACCA predicates

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (holding ACCA’s residual clause void for vagueness)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (Johnson rule applies retroactively on collateral review)
Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (Florida robbery categorically satisfies ACCA elements clause)
In re Colon, 826 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir.) (aider/abettor of robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under elements-based definition)
United States v. Williams, 334 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir.) (aider/abetor treated as responsible for principal’s acts)
United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937 (11th Cir.) (Florida armed robbery as ACCA predicate)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (use of charging/judgment documents to determine the nature of prior convictions)
United States v. Joyner, 882 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir.) (Florida attempted robbery qualifies as a violent felony)