Jill B. & Travis B. v. State
297 Neb. 57
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 2010 Jill and Travis B. inquired of Jodene Gall, a Nebraska DHHS children and family services specialist, whether prospective adoptee K.D.M. had any sexual history; Gall responded no while records available to her (database, intake/forensic reports, and a private narrative) reflected allegations of sexual abuse and sexual acting out.
- K.D.M. was placed in the parents’ home; about 5 months later K.D.M. sexually assaulted the parents’ child.
- The parents sued the State of Nebraska and DHHS under the State Tort Claims Act for negligent failure to warn/disclose and negligent supervision; the State pleaded the misrepresentation/deceit exception to the Act as an affirmative defense.
- The district court (bench trial) found Gall knew of allegations and intentionally misrepresented/withheld K.D.M.’s sexual history; it concluded the parents’ claims were rooted in misrepresentation and dismissed the complaint under the § 81-8,219(4) intentional-torts exception.
- On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding the misrepresentation exception bars the claims (including negligence framed claims) because their gravamen was misrepresentation; it also rejected the parents’ procedural challenges and declined to extend Fuhrman where it conflicted with later precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether law-of-the-case barred relitigation after denial of summary judgment | District court’s summary judgment denial decided immunity did not apply | Denial was interlocutory; genuine issues remained for trial | Denial not final; law-of-the-case inapplicable |
| Whether State properly pled misrepresentation/deceit affirmative defense | State’s answer was imperfect; plaintiffs lacked fair notice | Answer and pretrial order provided fair notice of misrepresentation defense | Defense sufficiently pleaded and preserved by pretrial order |
| Whether misrepresentation/deceit exception bars claims involving physical (nonpecuniary) injury | Misrepresentation tort requires pecuniary/commercial loss; exception limited to economic claims | Exception covers misrepresentation broadly, including personal-injury contexts when gravamen is misrepresentation | Exception applies to noncommercial/physical-injury claims when claim’s essence is misleading communication |
| Whether negligent supervision/operational-duty claims avoid the misrepresentation exception | Plaintiffs: independent operational duties (supervision/training) create liability separate from misrepresentation | State: plaintiffs’ negligence theories are inextricably linked to misrepresentation and therefore barred | Negligent-supervision claim barred if it arises out of the misrepresentation; no independent duty alleged |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961) (FTCA misrepresentation exception covers negligent as well as intentional misrepresentations)
- Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. 289 (1983) (misrepresentation exception applies where claim’s essence is misinformation on which plaintiff relied; distinguishes claims based on separate operational duties)
- Stonacek v. City of Lincoln, 279 Neb. 869 (2010) (Nebraska applies Neustadt/Block reasoning; failure to communicate critical information is a misrepresentation for sovereign-immunity purposes)
- Johnson v. State, 270 Neb. 316 (2005) (negligent supervision/selection claims arising out of an intentional tort are barred by the intentional-torts exception)
- Fuhrman v. State, 265 Neb. 176 (2003) (disapproved insofar as it held that a mere nondisclosure without inference of deliberateness falls outside the misrepresentation exception)
- United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (plurality explaining Congressional intent that government not be financially responsible for employees’ assaults and batteries)
