Jhonathan Victoria Javier v. Attorney General United States, 826 F.3d 127

Petitioner Jhonathan Victoria Javier, a Dominican national and lawful permanent resident since 2009, was convicted in Pennsylvania (2014) of terroristic threats (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706(a)(1)) and carrying a firearm in public (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6108).
DHS charged Javier with removability based on a crime involving moral turpitude and a firearms offense; an IJ found him removable on both grounds.
Javier appealed to the BIA; the BIA initially summarily affirmed (July 13, 2015), then reopened and issued a merits decision (August 19, 2015) affirming removal based solely on the terroristic-threats conviction.
The BIA treated § 2706(a)(1) as categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because it requires a specific intent to terrorize and targets conduct that inflicts psychological distress.
Javier argued the statute could cover threats to commit simple assault (allegedly non‑turpitudinous), so § 2706(a)(1) is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Third Circuit consolidated petitions, dismissed review of the July 13 order for lack of jurisdiction, and denied the petition as to the August 19 BIA decision.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 2706(a)(1) is categorically a "crime involving moral turpitude"	Javier: statute can criminalize threats to commit simple assault (non‑turpitudinous), so it is not categorically turpitudinous	Gov't/BIA: statute requires specific intent to terrorize; the communicative act with that mens rea is inherently turpitudinous	Held: § 2706(a)(1) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because of its specific intent requirement
Whether the court can review the IJ's determination that § 6108 is a "firearm offense"	Javier: challenges IJ finding § 6108 categorically a firearm offense	Gov't: BIA did not adopt IJ's firearms ruling in its decision	Held: Court lacks jurisdiction to review IJ finding because BIA did not adopt it
Jurisdiction to review BIA’s July 13, 2015 summary affirmance	Javier: sought review of July 13 order	Gov't: BIA reopened and issued a merits decision later	Held: Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the BIA reopened the appeal
Whether modified categorical approach was required	Javier: BIA should have applied modified categorical approach to the conviction record	Gov't: statutory mens rea alone suffices to show categorical turpitude	Held: Even under modified categorical approach result is same; no error in treating § 2706(a)(1) as categorically turpitudinous

Jean-Louis v. Attorney General, 582 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2009) (categorical approach for moral turpitude analysis)
Partyka v. Attorney General, 417 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2005) (elements‑focus and definition of turpitude)
Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2004) (no deference to BIA’s interpretation of state statute)
Brown v. United States, 765 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2014) (divisibility analysis)
Mahn v. Attorney General, 767 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2014) (hallmark of moral turpitude: reprehensible act with conscious deliberation)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (preserving elements focus in categorical approach)
Commonwealth v. Walker, 836 A.2d 999 (Pa. Super. 2003) (distinguishing § 2706 subsections by mens rea)
Commonwealth v. Tizer, 684 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super. 1996) (terroristic threats cause psychological distress and invade personal security)
Chanmouny v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810 (8th Cir. 2004) (intent to terrorize distinguishes terroristic threats from simple assault)
Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2000) (corrupt scienter is touchstone of moral turpitude)