Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. Village of Westhampton Beach
778 F.3d 390
2d Cir.2015Background
- In 2010 East End Eruv Association (EEEA) contracted with Verizon and LIPA to place plastic strips (lechis) on utility poles in Westhampton Beach to create an eruv, a boundary used by some Orthodox Jews to permit certain activities on the Sabbath.
- EEEA finances, installs, and maintains the lechis; LIPA’s license to EEEA is nonexclusive and paid.
- Plaintiffs (Sheiffer, Lubliner, and Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach) sued seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the eruv violated the Establishment Clause.
- The district court dismissed claims against EEEA and Verizon under Rule 12(b)(6); later granted LIPA judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Plaintiffs dismissed the remaining defendant (Village) without prejudice and appealed.
- On appeal, defendants contested appellate jurisdiction and Article III standing; the court found jurisdictional defects cured and plaintiffs’ pleaded injury adequate for standing at the pleadings stage.
- On the merits the court held EEEA and Verizon are private actors (no state action), and LIPA’s conduct (licensing space to erect the eruv) did not violate the Establishment Clause under Lemon.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appellate jurisdiction/finality | Dismissal of Village without prejudice makes the district judgment nonfinal | Order is final because plaintiffs disclaim intent to revive Village claim | Finality cured by plaintiffs’ disclaimer; appeal allowed |
| Standing (Article III) | Plaintiffs will be confronted daily and feel religiously coerced/uncomfortable | Eruv is unobtrusive and conveys no message; injury speculative | Plaintiffs’ allegations of daily confrontation suffice at pleading stage |
| State-action requirement | LIPA/others’ licensing is government involvement establishing religion | EEEA and Verizon are private actors; LIPA is a state actor but neutral | EEEA and Verizon not state actors — claims dismissed; LIPA is state actor but claim fails on merits |
| Establishment Clause (Lemon) — purpose/effect/entanglement | Eruv advances religion and signals governmental endorsement | Licensing is a neutral, paid accommodation; lechis are nearly invisible; private parties install/maintain them | Under Lemon, neutral accommodation satisfies secular purpose; no endorsement perceived by reasonable observer; no excessive entanglement — claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479 (2d Cir. 2009) (standing in Establishment Clause context for discomfort from religious displays)
- Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (three-part Establishment Clause test)
- Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (neutral accommodation of religious practice can be secular)
- Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (reasonable observer test in religious-display cases)
- Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (reasonable observer would not perceive governmental endorsement from an eruv)
- Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 760 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing continued application of Lemon)
- L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419 (2d Cir. 2011) (when a document is integral to a complaint)
- Amaker v. Weiner, 179 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1999) (treatment of extrinsic materials on motions to dismiss)
- ACLU of N.J. v. City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293 (D.N.J. 1987) (permitting eruv on public property is accommodation, not Establishment Clause violation)