Jesus Ruben Molina v. Elias Alvarado
441 S.W.3d 578
Tex. App.2014Background
- On Oct. 23, 2010, Molina allegedly struck Alvarado with a City of McCamey vehicle and fled; Alvarado sued for injuries and failure to render aid.
- Alvarado first sued the City (July 23, 2012) and later amended to add Molina as an individual defendant (Oct. 10, 2012).
- Molina moved for summary judgment under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.106(a), arguing the plaintiff’s prior suit against the City operated as an irrevocable election barring suit against the employee.
- The City separately filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss under § 101.106(e); Molina asserted Fifth Amendment privileges and resisted discovery on grounds he was not a proper party.
- The trial court denied Molina’s summary judgment motion; Molina sought interlocutory review under § 51.014(a)(5).
- The court framed the core legal question as whether § 101.106(a) permanently bars ultra vires and individual claims against an employee once the governmental unit is sued, and whether such a construction would abrogate common-law ultra vires rights and implicate the Texas Open Courts Clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether filing suit against the governmental unit first irrevocably bars any suit against its employee for the same subject matter under § 101.106(a) | Molina: § 101.106(a)’s plain text grants permanent immunity to employee once the employer is sued, barring official and ultra vires claims | Alvarado: Reading § 101.106(a) to bar ultra vires claims abrogates long‑held common‑law remedies and conflicts with TTCA as a whole | Court: § 101.106(a) must be read in context; it bars suit only where employee is sued in official capacity (i.e., acting within scope of employment). Material fact issues about scope preclude summary judgment |
| Whether § 101.106(a), as applied to ultra vires claims, violates the Texas Constitution’s Open Courts provision by extinguishing common-law relief | Molina: statute controls and creates election-of-remedies bar | Alvarado: plaintiff’s common-law ultra vires remedy would be abrogated without adequate alternative | Court: Avoids constitutional problem by construing § 101.106(a) not to extinguish ultra vires claims; preserves common-law remedy where employee acted outside scope of employment |
| Whether § 101.106(f) provides an adequate statutory alternative protecting ultra vires claims | Molina: § 101.106(f) allows election to sue employee and thus supports § 101.106(a) | Alvarado: § 101.106(f) places a plaintiff to an impractical early election pre-discovery and is constitutionally suspect post‑Franka | Court: § 101.106(f) is constitutionally fragile post‑Franka; cannot rely on it to justify reading § 101.106(a) to eliminate ultra vires claims |
| Whether summary judgment was proper based on § 101.106(a) | Molina: entitled to summary judgment because Alvarado sued the City first | Alvarado: factual disputes exist on whether Molina acted within scope of employment; thus summary judgment improper | Court: Affirmed denial of summary judgment—scope of employment is a material fact question for trial |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. 2008) (immunity from suit divests courts of subject‑matter jurisdiction)
- Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (sovereign immunity principles)
- Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011) (scope of claims that could have been brought against agency under TTCA)
- Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2008) (legislative history and purpose of § 101.106 election‑of‑remedies)
- Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1994) (purpose of immunity: protect governmental functioning, not erring officials)
- Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1995) (plaintiff can opt to pursue common‑law remedy against employee instead of government)
- Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. 2010) (statutes displacing common law construed narrowly to avoid Open Courts problems)
- Cash Am. Int’l, Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12 (Tex. 2000) (presumption that legislature did not intend to displace common‑law rights without clear repugnance)