*1
Thе State claims we must
venting
make the dis
the dissemination of the information
urges
tinction it
between
expres
conduct and
justifies
to the
alone
the disclosure. A
argues
sion.
It
by citing
42 U.S.C.
confidentiality
may
necessary
order
be
1981,1982
§§
may
as “conduct” statutes that
provide
grant
the least obtrusive means to
enforced,
legitimately
Supreme
be
Court
rights
deferring
disclosure
while
to First
housing
has likewise sanctioned the
discrimi
Tilton,
Amendment
concerns.
nation
conduct-prohibitive
statutes as
ones
(construing
S.W.2d at 956
Seattle Times Co.
any contrary policy
protect
override
Rhinehart,
v.
467 U.S.
104 S.Ct.
expression.
content-based
See R.A.V. v.
(1984)).
L.Ed.2d 17
justify
It does not itself
— U.S.-,-,
St.
Paul
disclosure.
2538, 2546-47,
5.Ct.
The State contends that up we must
hold the trial court order because that court
found privilege by Lowe waived the his “se
lective” disclosure of certain Klan members. Most of Lowe’s evidence of individual Klan KASSEN, R.N., County Hospi Lisa Dallas membership arose from his effort to show tal District Parkland Memorial d/b/a respecting State was not the First Hospital, Gurjeet Kalra, M.D., S. privilege by using Amendment the least ob University of Texas Southwestern trusive method to obtain the information it Dallas, Petitioners, Medical Center at sought. sought Thus Lowe to show that the specific State knew or should have known of v. Klan alleged members who were to have Judy HATLEY and William
participated suspect activity, Johnson, Respondents. sought should have first from them which No. D-4248. Klan participated members in the conduct. We find that the incidental disclosures of Supreme Court of Texas. individual significantly members werе not more extensive than Argued May the answers about indi appeared meetings repre viduals who Decided Nov. sented themselves as members in Gibson. Rehearing Overruled Dec. The Court in Gibson failed to find waiv er.
Finally, reject argu we the State’s confidentiality pre-
ment that a strict order expressly distinguished 6. The Court part R.A.V.on the such as racial bias form of the motive for expression ground i.e., conduct versus in Wisconsin providing en- statutes conduct — - Mitchell, -, U.S. 113 S.Ct. punishment hanced for so-called “hate crimes” (1993), punishment L.Ed.2d 436 which held that are constitutional. may for conduct be enhanced because factors *3 Dallas, Bemays, Cox,
Richard Thomas L. Aversano, Jr., Ldlum, Donna M. James An- Brocato, Austin, Jr., Morales, thony G. Dan petitioners. Horany, Girards, John James E. R. David Weiner, Dallas, respondents. GONZALEZ, Justice, delivered the Court, opinion which HIGHTOWER, HECHT, and CORNYN Justices, SPECTOR, join.
In this case we decide doctor whether a employed by governmental enti- nurse ty were entitled to the defense individually sued for medical when malpractice. immu- We conclude that official nity conclu- question is a fact that was not sively part We thus affirm established. appeals of the of the court of which doctor reversed for the nurse, and remand proceed- causes to the trial court for further Parkland opinion. had mgs We also because she been consistent with allege other institutions before. conclude that failed several injury arising from a or use of Johnson to condition file that staff refer recommended tangible personal property. County We therefore rather admit her MHMR than Dallas institution, judgment of thе reverse the court presented herself to an when she County District Hospital as to Dallas symp- significantly had different unless she (Parkland) Hospital Parkland Memorial past. Kalra found toms those in the d/b/a University of Texas past conduct consistent with Johnson’s (Southwestern), Medical at Dallas Center behavior, inpatient did not admit her for court as and affirm the of the trial care.
to these defendants. angry. demanded Johnson became She *4 the of her medication and threatened return I. Facts of if to herself in front a car she did throw wrongful death action arose from the Kassen, pills. Kalra Lisa not receive the February suicide Ms. on of Pennie Johnson R.N., charge in the nurse Parkland emer- the Johnson, then had been a room, gency jointly to return the decided not nearly patient chronic health mental for ten though not associatеd medicine even doctors condition, years. diagnosed a Johnson’s as pre- had with Parkland or Southwestern disorder, personality antisocial borderline it. Kassen then told Johnson scribed by depression, pseudo was manifested sei- pills accept- if she would return the Johnson zures, others, tantrums, on temper attacks expense. ed a ride at Parkland’s taxi home behavior, manipulative drug and alcohol refused, stating that she did not abuse, gestures. Al- and suicidal threats and security a go want home. called Someone though spent teenage had much she of her out, officer to escort her but Johnson volun- institutions, in and adult life her doctors had tarily the alone her med- left without long-term decided that institutionalization committed suicide short ication. Johnson therapeutiс. They treating was not were her freeway stepping time into traffic. later outpatient as an at the forensic unit the County Judy Hatley Dallas parents, Mental Health and Mental Johnson’s Wil- (Dallas MHMR). System Johnson, County wrongful Retardation liam filed this death action Kalra, Parkland, Kassen, against and South- February 13, Shortly midnight before on western, alleging negli- that the defendants police officer discovered Johnson daughter’s Each gently caused their death.1 along a walking expressway. Dallas Because summary of these defendants moved for herself, threatening she was to harm judgment. Parkland and Southwestern ar- psychiatric emergency officer her to the took gued plaintiffs allege failed to a use room at Parkland. This was second her visit property required tangible personаl days. Complaining to Parkland in two Tort Act. Kalra under the Texas Claims depression, Johnson informed a Parkland immunity. of official relied on defense nurse taken that she had the medication argued she was not liable because Kassen day, possession seven times that exceed- 93.001(a)(2) Prac- Texas Civil Section ing dosage. prescribed After medical provides tice an affirma- and Remedies Code pills, taking staff witnessed her additional of suicide. tive defense cases they confiscated Johnson’s medication and placed it in nurses’ station. summary judgment granted court The trial specify- Gurjeet
Dr.
for
and Kalra without
S. Kalra examined Johnson.
time,
third-year
ing
proceeded to trial
grounds.
At the
he
The case
was
resident
Southwestern,
After
serving
against
Parkland and Kassen.
psychiаtry at
rota-
chief,
Park-
psychiatric
plaintiffs presented
Park-
their case
tion in Parkland’s
ward.
verdicts.
land
on Johnson
land and Kassen moved
directed
had a “difficult
file”
appeal.
against
parties
1. The
settled their claim
Dallas
this
County
MHMR. It and two other defendants
again
immunity.
immunity,
right
sovereign
ereign
Parkland
relied on
is not affected
government
Kassen
the first
time asserted official whether a
has official
immunity as a
trial court
defense. The
See Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code
104.008, 108.002, 108.003;
granted
§§
the directed
rendered
v.
Washington
verdicts and
(Tex.
Houston,
nothing.
take
writ).
App.
no
— Texarkana
court of
It
The
reversed.
held:
(1) Kalra and Kassen were not entitled to
purpose
immunity
of official
because
did
exer-
functioning
insulate
(2)
“governmental” discretion, and
cise
litigation,
pro
from the harassment
not to
рlaintiffs had stated a claim
the Texas
Erwin,
erring officials.
tect
Westfall
Tort Claims Act
and South-
Parkland
292, 295,
580, 583,
U.S.
108 S.Ct.
98 L.Ed.2d
by alleging
Johnson’s
western
misuse of
gov
would
suffer
records
medical
and her medication. The
officers,
judg
ernment
who must exercise
court also stated that
jobs,
ment and discretion
were sub
suicide,
based
the affirmative
defense
ject
second-guessed
lawsuits that
civil
93.001(a)(2),
&
Tex.Civ.PeaC.
Rem.Code
(Seoond)
their decisions. See Restatement
improper
have been
the evi-
b;
§ 895D
Kooh,
cmt.
Charles H.
of Torts
did
dence
not establish that
con-
Johnson’s
*5
Jr.,
Law
Administrative
and PraotiCe
duct, apart from the
Kalra or
conduct of
(1985).
immunity
§ 10.71
Official
increases
Kassen, was the sole cause of
death. All
efficiency
employees
of
applications
defendants filed
for writ of error
spend
defending
need not
time
frivolous
Court.
with this
As
charges.
Supreme
Id.
the United States
noted,
impor
immunity
Court has
official
is
Immunity
II. Official
tant:
A
[Ojfficials
government
of
to
should be free
We first determine
Kalra
whether
exercise their duties
unembarrassed
and Kassen were entitled to the defense of
damage
respect
fear of
suits
of acts
law defense
common
done in the course of those duties —suits
government
personal
protects
officers from
energies
which
consume time
and
liability
performing discretionary
duties
gov-
which would otherwise be devoted to
good
scope
authority.
faith within the
of their
ernmental service and the threat of which
Chambers,
City
Lancaster v.
883 S.W.2d
of
fearless,
might
vig-
appreciably inhibit the
(Tex.1994)
650,
(citing Campbell
653-54
v.
orous,
poli-
and effective administration of
Jones,
101,
425,
153 Tеx.
264 S.W.2d
427
government.
cies of
(1954));
Barner,
Carpenter v.
797 S.W.2d
Matteo,
564, 571,
Barr v.
360
S.Ct.
U.S.
79
denied);
(Tex.App.
101
writ
— Waco
1335, 1339, L.Ed.2d
3
1434
Resources,
Dep’t
v. Texas
Russell
Human
of
(Tex.App
746
513
S.W.2d
. —Texarkana
B
denied);
Story,
writ
see Baker v.
(Tex.Civ.App.
ground
immunity,
Antonio
S.W.2d
On the
of official
— San
n.r.e.).
distinguish
prevailed
summary
writ ref'd
offi
on his
Kalra
motion for
immunity,
protects
prevailed
mo
judgment
cial
which
individual offi
and Kassen
on her
liability,
immunity,
summary
sovereign
cials from
from
tion for directed verdict. For the
protects governmental
judgment
proper,
had to
which
entities
to
been
Kalra
Baker,
liability.
conclusively
at 643. If a
each element
his
S.W.2d
establish
of
plaintiff
right
has a
Montgomery Kennedy,
of action
defense. See
v.
(Tex.1984).2
Likewise,
due to the state’s waiver
sov- S.W.2d
following
guide
deciding
disputed
2. The
standards
a trial court in
whether
there is
considering
summary judgment
motion:
precluding
judg-
summary
issue
material fact
ment,
movant for
has the
evidence favorable to the non-movant
showing
genuine
no
burden
that there is
as true.
will be taken
is
issue material fact and that it
entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
“[wjhere
law
are those
conclusively her offi Ministerial acts
Kassen had to establish
prescribes
the duties to be
If
and defines
immunity
cial
defense.
sufficient evidence
precision and
trial,
performed with
certain-
presented at
such
was
such that “reasonable
nothing
the exercise of
ty
differ
the fact determina
as
leave
minds could
about
judgment
or
... but where
jury,”
Kalra and
discretion
tion
be made
then
the exercise of
act to be done involves
Kassen were not entitled to
as a
judgment,
it is
to be
Transportation
Co.
discretion
matter оf law.
Ins.
ministerial”_
(Tex.1994)
If
Moriel,
an ac-
10, 25
(quoting
merely
deemed
879 S.W.2d
deliberation,
Powers,
Ratliff,
tion
decision
Jr. and Jack
Anoth
involves
William
discretionary;
judgment,
is
actions
it
er Look at “No Evidence”
“Insufficient
(1991)).
Evidence,”
require
to orders or
69 Tex.L.Rev.
which
obedience
duty
actor
performance
to which the
The elements of the defense of official
choice,
has
are ministerial.
no
(1)
performance
of a
discre
(cita-
Lancaster,
City
at
883 S.W.2d
(2)
(3)
tionary
good
faith
within
function
omitted). However,
tions
other courts have
authority.
scope
the employee’s
most
involve some
noted that
duties
measure
Lancaster,
second
discretion,
including purely ministerial
third
were un
elements of
defense
See,
Baker,
e.g.,
at 645.
duties.
disputed;
conclusively
Kalra and Kassen
es
discretionary
“probably
act
Labelling an
plaintiffs only
tablished them.3 The
contend
only
complex
more
a shorthand notation for a
one
issue remains: were Kalra
Kas-
policy
Keeton,
su-
decision.” Prosser
performing “discretionary”
sen
functions that
pra §
at 1062.
immunity?
them official
would entitle
professionals
Medical
exercise considerable
examining
pa
and discretion in
C
*6
tient, evaluating symptoms,
prescribing
primary
The
issue
us is wheth
before
argue
plaintiffs
that such
treatment. The
distinguishes
govern
er Texas
medical from
by
physicians
government-employed
actions
in applying
mental discretion
the doctrine of
functions,
only
not
and nurses are
medical
government-employed
official
to
governmental
plaintiffs
functions. The
thus
personnel. Ordinarily,
medical
official immu
and Kassen were not
conclude
Kalra
nity
any
by
extends to
action or decision
immunity, relying upon Armenda
entitled to
“discretionary.”
state
that is
See
Dist.,
County Hosp.
rez
Tarrant
781
Lancaster,
D tiff’s in committing attempting conduct case, present In the Kalra and Kas- to commit suicide was the sole cause of the sen did not admit Johnson to Parkland be damages sustained; however, provided, cause her difficult file indicated hos attempted the suicide or suicide was pitalization therapeutic was not for her. caused in whole or in part on failure Only appeal on argue did Kalra and Kassen part comply defendant that the need to allocate scarce state standard, applicable legal then such among potential patients resources also influ attempted suicide or suicide shall not be a enced their decision. Because Kalra’s sum defense. mary judgment motion and Kassen’s directed added). govern verdict motion did not (emphasis state that this Id. Kalra and Southwest- figured mental concern decision not ern had no they defense under this section if Johnson, to admit we cannot it comply care, consider failed to with the standard of appeal. Corp., See Stiles v. Resolution Trust and their failure was a cause of Johnson’s If support there was suicide. To their motion for sum- no basis mary for Kalra’s and judgment, Kassen’s decision not Kalra and Southwestern except therapeutic to admit presented deposition testimony consid of Dr. erations, Butler, Roger then their exercise of discretion was who testified that Kalra met only, medical appropriate were not entitled to treating standard of care We conclude that Kassen Johnson. The controverted this ev- prove conclusively and Kalra failed to deposition idence with testimony of Dr. immunity applies 8. Official imposition liability to executive officials the extent to which the personnel gov- and to lower level who exercise impair employee’s free exercise of ernmental discretion. See Restatement discretion, of Torts 895D cmt. d We decline to (Second) responsibility the extent to which financial attempt precisely to define when a employee, will fall on the *9 employee’s "governmental” acts involve discre- 5. the likelihood that harm will result to the tion, but recommend that courts consider the acts, employee if the following factors: type 6. the nature and seriousness of the of importance the nature and of the function may produced, harm that be and employee performing, availability injured party the to the other of passing judgment the extent to which on the remedies and forms of relief. by employee exercise of discretion the will § See id. 895D cmt. f. passing judgment amount to on the conduct of agen- a coordinate branch of or an thereof, cy gave Litman, or omission Kalra unit whose act who concluded that emmental Robert to claim. rise the discharging negligent was The her medication. the without says conclusively es- the record Kalra testimony Butler Litman a of and raised employee the he was an of tablished that of fact on genuine issue material whether time of County at the John- Dallas MHMR applicable and met the Kalra subsequent Southwestern visit Parkland and sui- son’s Therefore, summary legal of care. Therefore, County standard Dallas since cide. 93.001(a)(2) judgment on Section based plaintiffs prior with MHMR settled the improper. trial, have been Evans v. against See the action Section 101.106 bars of (5th Cir.1993) Marlin, However, 986 F.2d did him as a matter of law. Kalra (denying summary un- judgment ground for defendants include this in his motion not summаry 93.001 judgment. der Tex.Civ.PRAC. Rem.Code We thus cannot consid- & Stiles, jail at 26. question appeal. the whether a inmate’s it on of fact er suicide). of conduct was the sole cause his remand, proper- Kalra Kassen Upon if defenses,
ly foregoing raise the trial the B may along them court consider argue Kalra Southwestern also appropriate was be Sovereign Immunity IV. cause Johnson’s suicide was foreseeable govern- Parkland and Southwestern However, as a of law. matter the defen entitled to the defense mental entities judgment summary dants’ evidence did sovereign immunity. must determine conclusively negate plaintiffs’ allegation the Tort Act’s limited the Texas Claims whether that Kalra was aware of the seriousness of sovereign immunity the allowed waiver (At Johnson's suicide trial threats. the bring against these plaintiffs claim defendants, against the other Parkland petitioners. The Tort Claims Act Texas Kassen, evidence conflicted whether John sovereign immunity waives for: foreseeable.) son’s was suicide Litman testi by personal injury and death ... a caused psychiatrist fied that a reasonable under sim tangible personal condition or use recognized ilar circumstances should property if governmental real the unit genuine. as Consequently, Johnson’s threats would, private person, be were it liable
whether her suicide was foreseeable was according to Texas law. claimant genuine fact that precluded issue material summary 101.021(2). judgment. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code is whether Johnson’s suicide was
issue by tangible caused a condition or use C property such that Parkland and finally argues that Kalra the sum be liable for Johnson’s Southwestern would mary judgment favor be af his should private persons. death were firmed 101.106 of the Texas under Section on the condition or use of relied Civil Practice and Remedies Code. That following medical rec- property: Johnson’s provides: section file, ords, emergency the difficult manual, procedures room confiscated A in an action or settlement medication.9 chapter claim [Governmental Liability Tort bars action on a mo- prevailed Claims] for Because Southwestern subject solely at involving summary the same matter aimed tion gov- plaintiffs’ pleadings,10 we look to those claimant tangible property support of their 9. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amended Petition listed items cation argument under the Texas Tort Claims Act. tangible property Parkland Although did used. not include pursued should have this attack 10. Southwestern list, they fairly plead medication Johnson’s by special exception rather than motion petition. a use of the medication elsewhere *10 summary judgment. Dep’t See Texas Correc- pleading medi- suffices for them name the (Tex.1974). Herring, 9-10 tions v. 513 S.W.2d pleadings they to determine whether drugs stated a conclude that the non-use available 101.021(2). cause of action under Section As during emergency medical treatment is not a Parkland, prevailed which on a motion for tangible personal property use of trig verdict, directed we must determine whether gers sovereign immunity. waiver of plaintiffs presented sup- some evidence Dist., Floyd Willacy County Hosp. porting their claim. Since the evidence at (Tex.App.—Corpus corresponded trial allegations with the plead n.r.e.). Christi writ ref'd plaintiffs, inquiry is the same for case, plaintiffs this claim that In both concerning defendants the condition or Kalra’s and provide Kassen’s failure to property. use of medication hospital when Johnson left the recently We held that information sequence caused her to commit suicide. This medical records tangible personal is not allege of events injury arising does not an property meaning within the of the Texas from the “use” of the medication. It states a University Tort Claims Act. Texas Medi property claim for non-use of that does not York, cal Branch v. 871 S.W.2d trigger sovereign immunity waiver of York, we concluded that the the Texas Tort Compare Claims Act. sovereign state did not waive immunity by its Quinn Ctr., v. Memorial Medical 764 S.W.2d using, misusing, using or not information in a (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi no medical record. Id. reasoning of York writ) (finding hospital pharmacy’s dispens records, extends to Johnson’s medical ing drug tangible of a use of file, difficult emergency and the room Act). property within the Texas Tort Claims procedures Use, misuse, manual. or non-use Accordingly, we hold that Parkland and by agents these items of Parkland and prevail Southwestern were entitled to support did not a claim under of sovereign immunity. defense the Texas Tort Claims Act. reasons, foregoing For the we affirm that Regarding medication, Johnson’s we also part appeals’ judgment of the court of which plaintiffs conclude that did not state a reversed the for Kalra cause of action under the Texas Tort Claims Kassen, and the directed vеrdict for Act. The did not claim that a remand their causes to the trial court for condition of the medication caused Johnson’s proceedings further opin- consistent with this death, but that prescription drugs use ion. We reverse the of the court They point caused her death. to Parkland’s Parkland, as to Southwestern and agents and Southwestern’s allowing Johnson and affirm the of the trial court as leave the returning without to these defendants. medication as tangible personal the “use” of property that caused her suicide. PHILLIPS, C.J., I, II, joins in Parts We have never held that a non-use III of opinion. the Court’s property support can a claim under the 101.021, Texas Tort Claims Act. Section GAMMAGE, J., joins in I Parts and III of requires
which property’s condition or opinion. the Court’s injury, use to support cause the does not ENOCH, J., sitting. interpretation. See LeLeaux v. Hamshire- Dist., Indep. Fannett Sch. 835 S.W.2d PHILLIPS, Justice, Chief concurs and (Tex.1992) (stating that put “use” means “to dissents. service; bring or into action employ or apply given purpose”) I, to a (quoting join II, I parts Mount III of the Court’s Indep. Pleasant Sch. opinion. Dist. v. Estate Lind Because Dr. Kalra and Nurse Kas- (Tex.1989)). burg, sen did not establish that exercised However, Duke, present plaint. because the did not See San Jacinto River Auth. v. Tex.R.App.P. objection request an to the (Tex.1990) trial court or (citing S.W.2d 52(a)). opportunity petition to amend their in the wake summary judgment, they of the waived com- *11 posses- remained in Johnson’s treatment of would have governmental discretion sion, Johnson, agree I the claims not theirs. Pennie that them be remanded for further should join I thе Accordingly, Court’s however, join, in part I not proceedings. do ap- judgment of the court affirming the opinion. I that of the Court’s believe IV I peals Kalra and Kassen. Because as to arising alleged injury from respondents judgment of the court affirm the would also tangible by personal property Park- use of Hospital and as to Parkland Hospital land and Southwestern Medical Center, I Medical dissent I would therefore also remand the Center. judgment. of the the remainder Court’s against those defendants for further claims proceedings. dissents, GAMMAGE, Justice, and concurs DOGGETT, joined by Justice. agree
I the Court that have with tangible per- not stated a claim of misuse of of the I concur in the court property the Act sonal Tort Claims the trial court the the extent it remands to regarding either Pennie Johnson’s medical involving the and nurse. I con- cause doctor records, the the difficult file or emer- majority opinion cur the that official with gency procedures room manual. See Univer- not as a matter of was established sity Medical Branch at Galveston v. Texas law, disagree though I with the standard the York, conclude, I S.W.2d view, my non-governmen- adopts. court however, plaintiffs’ allegations relating that all, is in the decision at tal discretion involved a to Johnson’s medication do state such the should not be able to claim claim. special agree I that the suicide further prescription There can little doubt that be law, is not established as a matter of defense drugs tangible property. Al- (2), 93.001(a)(1), defined,
though statutorily “tangible not per- & Rem.Code Tex.Civ.PRAC. special that and with the conclusiоn other property something sonal refers to that has a as a defenses were not raised or established concrete, corporeal, and palpable existence.” matter of law. York, 871 178. Unlike medical records, which are useful because me- join Phillips’ I conclusion Chief Justice information, intangible utility morialize concurring dissenting opinion that in his and prescription drug physical proper- a tangible is a use of confiscation of medication drug of the ties itself. majori- property. I am incredulous tangible ty physical call a it “non-use” adequate- I further conclude that prescribed property medication confiscate medication, ly pled use of Johnson’s caus- physicians from the owner for whom other injury, allegation ing by their that Parklаnd’s prescribed, knowingly it then and was agents negligently al- Southwestern’s consciously from her. As the withhold it hospital leave lowed Johnson to without admits, expert majority was medi- even there returning previously her confiscated medi- negligent testimony cal to dis- it was I agree cation. Court that “non- charge her from the without of property use” is insufficient to state a medication, proxi- such could action Act, claim under Tort Claims mately caused her death. prescribe par- failure or administer a all we drug support Although ticular “use” of the medication is waiver case, however, sovereign immunity. really conclude Tort must address to case, I provide applies in this does not involve the mere failure to Claims Act believe Phillips’ necessary dissenting portion it of Chief Justice medicine. Rather concerns First, medicine, opinion prescribed actual falls short two instances. confiscation elsewhere, now already although had in I understand we are bound which Johnson misuse, I its hold- possession. York what view as erroneous This states a claim nonuse, merely ing, If I use of Johnson’s medi- pills. of the defen- still believe the medication, patient file state really it cal and difficult do dants had “not used” the records *12 tangible personal proper- claim misuse of
ty. University Texas Medical Branch v. (Tex.1994) York, J., Second,
(Gammage, dissenting). prop- York,
erly distinguishing I hold that a property
“non-use” of in all instances
insufficient to state a claim the Tort before, Act. I explained
Claims As have necessary property
non-use some item of property supplied safe the make use of has
properly been held at 181-82. actionable. Id. opinion reconciling
Today’s prior makes our difficult, impossi- all
decisions the more if not join holding Because I
ble. cannot the Tort Claims Act not reach does facts, respectfully I
these dissent.
Regina HOLT, Appellee, H. Texas, Appellant.
The STATE of
No. 599-93. Texas, Appeals
Court Criminal
En Banc.
June Swander, Worth, appel- H. Fort
Steven lee. Curry, Ayers,
Tim D.A. & Susan Warren Attys., Spencer Hardy, Leslie & Asst. Dist. Worth, Huttash, Atty., Fort Robert State’s Austin, for the State.