Jesus Jehovah v. Harold Clarke
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14252
| 4th Cir. | 2015Background
- Jehovah, a Virginia inmate, sued VDOC and officials alleging violations of RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment based on four practices: a ban on inmate consumption of communion wine, requirement to work on his Sabbath, assignment to non‑Christian/hostile cellmates, and alleged deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
- VDOC policies evolved: segregation bans on communion, a policy (2011) forbidding inmates from drinking wine at communion, a modified policy (2012) permitting wafers dipped in wine but not drinking, and later an absolute ban on inmate consumption (clergy may bring wine).
- Jehovah was assigned to a cleaning job that required work seven days a week; he alleges denied transfer requests and possible sanctions/loss of earned credits for failing to work on Sabbaths.
- Jehovah alleges repeated cell assignments with non‑Christians, including one inmate who harassed him with anti‑Christian rhetoric, and that grievances on housing were ignored.
- Jehovah alleges extensive and worsening medical symptoms from 2009–2012, including later diagnosis of pulmonary hypertension; he claims medical staff repeatedly ignored abnormal tests and many symptoms.
- District court dismissed (sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A) Jehovah’s Sabbath, housing, and Eighth Amendment claims, and granted summary judgment to defendants on the communion wine claims. The Fourth Circuit reversed in full and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Communion wine (RLUIPA) | Wine ban substantially burdens his sincere religious practice; government has not shown least‑restrictive means | Ban serves safety/security and alcoholism prevention; ban is rational | Reversed — genuine dispute; remand because record lacks least‑restrictive‑means showing and plaintiff lacked opportunity to litigate burden at summary judgment |
| Communion wine (First Amendment / Turner) | Ban unreasonably restricts exercise; alternatives exist and impact of accommodation is minimal | Ban reasonably related to penological interests (safety, contraband, addiction management) | Reversed — material facts and proposed alternatives create triable issue under Turner |
| Sabbath work (RLUIPA & First Amendment) | Denial of jobs that accommodate Sabbaths substantially burdens religious exercise; sanctions/credit loss coerces compliance | No constitutional right to prison jobs; burden is not substantial | Reversed — pleaded facts plausibly show substantial burden and, under Turner, accommodation might be an obvious alternative |
| Cell assignments (RLUIPA & First Amendment) | Being housed with anti‑Christian cellmates (and one who harassed him) burdens his exercise and chilled practices | Prisoners have no right to choose cellmates; exposure alone doesn’t burden religion | Reversed — allegations of harassment and plausible animus survive dismissal; remand for least‑restrictive‑means and Turner analysis |
| Deliberate indifference (Eighth Amendment) | Doctors ignored serious symptoms and abnormal tests despite diagnosis risk; conditions are objectively serious | Plaintiff received treatment; not deliberately indifferent | Reversed — complaint alleges objective serious conditions and facts suggesting subjective deliberate indifference sufficient to survive §1915A dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (prisoners retain free‑exercise rights subject to Turner reasonableness review)
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (four‑factor test for validity of prison regulations that impinge constitutional rights)
- Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (burden of rebutting prison regulation rests with prisoner)
- Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (RLUIPA protects institutionalized persons’ religious exercise)
- Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2006) (RLUIPA requires showing of substantial burden; contrasts strict scrutiny with Turner)
- Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170 (4th Cir. 2014) (plausibility standard for §1915A dismissals and pro se liberal construction)
- De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003) (Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference requires objective serious condition and subjective culpability)