Jessica Tellez v. Loretta E. Lynch, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 19082

In 2000 Jessica Tellez attempted to enter the U.S. at the San Ysidro border crossing, initially claimed U.S. citizenship, but admitted she was a Mexican citizen without valid entry documents.
She was deemed inadmissible, signed a form acknowledging a five-year bar, received an expedited removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and was returned to Mexico.
About a week later Tellez returned, presented in the passenger seat of a car, was waved through by an officer, and remained in the United States.
In 2012 she applied for a waiver and adjustment of status; DHS denied the applications and reinstated her prior expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) as an alien who had "reentered" illegally.
Tellez challenged reinstatement, arguing her initial border stop did not constitute an "entry" and thus her later presence could not be a "reentry." The Ninth Circuit denied her petition.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an alien removed at a border-crossing checkpoint has made an "entry" such that a subsequent return is a "reentry" under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)	Tellez: her initial encounter was not a legally cognizable "entry," so a later presence cannot be a "reentry" reinstating removal	Government: an alien who comes into U.S. territory at a border checkpoint and is removed has entered; a later return is a reentry under § 1231(a)(5)	Court: A removal after coming into U.S. territory at a border checkpoint constitutes an entry; a later return is a "reentry" triggering reinstatement.
Whether being waved through at the border negates the illegality of the entry	Tellez: she presented herself at the border and was allowed through, so her later presence was not an illegal reentry	Government: lack of valid documentation and prior expedited removal make the later entry illegal even if officer permitted passage	Court: Even if an officer waved her through, entry was illegal because she lacked required documentation and had been subject to prior removal.

United States v. Migi, 329 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003) (statutory-text focus for interpreting INA terms)
United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398 (U.S. 1929) (classic definition: entry implies coming from outside)
United States v. Pacheco-Medina, 212 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2000) (common-law rule requiring freedom from official restraint for "entry" in criminal context)
United States v. Lombera-Valdovinos, 429 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2005) (narrower common-law meaning of "enter" in § 1326 cases)
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (U.S. 2000) (canon that words must be read in the statute's overall scheme)
De Sandoval v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 440 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006) (discussing 1996 expansion of reinstatement provision)
Tamayo-Tamayo v. Holder, 725 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2013) (an entry can be illegal despite apparent admission when required documentation is lacking)