929 F.3d 554
8th Cir.2019Background
- In 2007 Jerry Brown pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received a 15-year ACCA statutory-minimum because he had three prior "violent felony" convictions, one being a 1977 Missouri second-degree burglary conviction under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 560.070 (1969) (repealed).
- Brown later filed a § 2255 motion arguing intervening Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on whether his 1977 burglary conviction qualifies as a "violent felony" under ACCA's enumerated-offenses clause.
- ACCA enumerates "burglary" but does not define it; the Supreme Court reads that term as "generic burglary": unlawful entry into a building or structure with intent to commit a crime (Taylor v. United States).
- The legal question turned on whether the 1969 Missouri statute was divisible by the location of the intrusion (building vs. booth/tent/boat/railroad car): if divisible, Brown's conviction for burglary of a building would match generic burglary; if indivisible, the statute criminalized broader conduct and thus would not categorically match generic burglary.
- The majority examined Missouri authoritative sources (statutory text, Missouri Supreme Court/appeals decisions, and Missouri Approved Jury Instructions) and concluded Missouri treated the disjunctive location phrases as alternative means of committing a single offense (i.e., indivisible).
- Because the statute was broader than generic burglary under the categorical approach (as clarified by Descamps and Mathis), Brown's 1977 conviction did not qualify as an ACCA "violent felony;" the court reversed and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brown's 1977 Missouri second-degree burglary conviction is a "violent felony" under ACCA | Brown: intervening Supreme Court rulings (Descamps/Mathis) make the statute non-divisible and broader than generic burglary, so it does not qualify | Government: Taylor and Eighth Circuit precedent treat the conviction as a qualifying burglary; also argues historical prosecutions under the statute were limited to buildings | The statute was indivisible (listed locations are means), so the conviction is broader than generic burglary and does not qualify as an ACCA predicate; reverse and remand for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishes "generic burglary" definition and discusses using record documents to confirm the underlying statutory variant)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (clarifies that if a statute covers some means outside the generic offense, the conviction does not qualify under the categorical approach)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishes elements from means and instructs divisibility inquiry for categorical analysis)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits which record documents courts may consult to identify the statutory basis of a prior conviction)
- United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018) (addresses scope of generic burglary for ACCA purposes, including structures and certain vehicles)
- United States v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1991) (Eighth Circuit decision applying Taylor; earlier precedent that the majority deemed not controlling in light of later Supreme Court cases)
- United States v. Naylor, 887 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (interpreting Missouri burglary statute language and treating disjunctive alternatives as means; relied upon by the majority here)