Jermaine A. Hopkins v. the City of Austin, the City of Austin Firefighters' Civil Service Commission, the City of Austin Police Officers' Civil Service Commission, and the City of Austin Emergency Medical Personnels' Civil Service Commission, 03-16-00148-CV

Background

Hopkins, an Austin police officer, was indefinitely suspended in October 2014 for alleged violations of city civil-service rules.
He appealed to an independent hearing examiner, who denied his appeal.
Hopkins sued in district court seeking judicial review, alleging the hearing examiner exceeded jurisdiction and that the decision was procured by fraud, collusion, or other unlawful means; he sought vacatur, reinstatement, and back pay.
Appellees filed a plea to the jurisdiction, attaching evidence that the examiner acted within the Civil Service Act and that Hopkins’ suit simply sought to relitigate the merits.
The district court granted the plea and dismissed Hopkins’s suit; Hopkins appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court had jurisdiction under Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 143.057(j) to review the hearing examiner’s decision	Hopkins argued the examiner exceeded jurisdiction by (1) affirming suspension despite Hopkins’ protected activity (PIA, Civil Rights Act) and (2) considering evidence outside the 180‑day limit	Appellees argued Hopkins pleaded only merits complaints and failed to allege facts showing the examiner acted without or beyond authority or that the award was procured by fraud/collusion	Court held Hopkins failed to plead facts to invoke jurisdiction; his claims merely challenge correctness, not that examiner acted beyond statutory authority; plea properly granted
Whether alleging the examiner’s order was procured by fraud, collusion, or unlawful means was adequately pleaded	Hopkins alleged the ruling was procured by fraud/collusion in his petition	Appellees argued the allegation was conclusory and insufficient to establish jurisdiction	Court held bare statutory recitation insufficient; must plead supporting facts; allegation inadequate
Whether consideration of acts older than 180 days barred the examiner (jurisdictional defect)	Hopkins contended examiner considered acts outside the 180‑day limitation, showing lack of jurisdiction	Appellees argued the 180‑day limit restricts department head’s complaint timing, not the examiner’s consideration of evidence to evaluate relevant acts	Court held even if older acts were considered, the Act does not bar such evidence; examiner may consider evidence to assess conduct within the six‑month window
Whether declaratory relief claim remained pending because defendants didn’t seek dismissal of that claim in their plea	Hopkins argued plea did not seek dismissal of declaratory relief	Appellees pointed to plea seeking dismissal of all claims on jurisdictional grounds	Court held plea sought dismissal of all claims; dismissal of declaratory relief proper

Key Cases Cited

Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (plea to jurisdiction standards; plaintiff’s burden to plead jurisdictional facts)
Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (pleading and jurisdiction principles)
Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) (court may consider evidence when resolving jurisdictional issues)
City of Houston v. Clark, 197 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. 2006) (scope of judicial review of hearing‑examiner/arbitration panel awards)
City of Pasadena v. Smith, 292 S.W.3d 14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009) (review when examiner exceeds authority/nondelegation doctrine)
Plaster v. City of Houston, 721 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986) (predecessor statute does not preclude consideration of older acts to explain acts within time limit)