Jeremy Pinson v. Charles Samuels, 411 U.S. App. D.C. 380

Background

Jeremy Pinson, a federal prisoner with at least three PLRA “strikes,” filed a suit in D.C. challenging conditions at the Talladega SMU and sought IFP status alleging imminent danger due to gang placement and his homosexuality.
The D.C. district court transferred Pinson’s case to the Northern District of Alabama for improper venue and deferred IFP determination to the transferee court.
Pinson filed a mandamus petition in the D.C. Circuit seeking to vacate the transfer and to compel the district clerk to accept allegedly rejected “Motions for Joinder”; four fellow inmates attempted to join the petition and seek IFP here.
The D.C. Circuit examined (1) whether Pinson qualifies for IFP despite three strikes under the imminent-danger exception, (2) standing of co-petitioners to challenge the transfer and clerk’s actions, and (3) whether monthly fee collection under 28 U.S.C. §1915(b) is capped per-prisoner or per-case.
The court denied Pinson IFP (finding imminent danger not adequately alleged), held co-petitioners lacked standing to challenge the transfer or the clerk’s alleged rejection, and adopted the per-case approach to PLRA fee collections, denying the stay of fee collection.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Pinson may proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. §1915(g)’s imminent-danger exception	Pinson: SMU designation placed him in imminent danger as a homosexual and former gang associate	Gov’t: Subsequent transfer and lack of adequate imminent-threat allegations; PLRA bars IFP given three strikes	Denied IFP: allegations at time of filing failed to show imminent danger (Mitchell controls)
Whether post-complaint events may be considered for imminent-danger inquiry	Pinson/amicus: later attacks and murders show ongoing danger	Gov’t: later relocation and post-filing events irrelevant	Court: consider only facts alleged at time complaint/IFP motion filed (post-filing events excluded)
Standing of co-petitioners to challenge district court transfer and clerk’s refusal to file joinders	Co-petitioners: they attempted to join below and were injured by clerk’s refusal and by transfer	Gov’t: they were non-parties and provided no evidence their joinder motions were filed	No standing: absent proof they submitted motions or were parties, they cannot seek mandamus to challenge transfer or clerk’s actions
Proper interpretation of §1915(b) monthly fee collection (per-prisoner cap vs. per-case payment)	Amicus/others: cap monthly withdrawals at 20% per prisoner to avoid access issues	Government/majority view: §1915 applies per action/appeal; initial fee and monthly payments accrue per case	Held per-case: each filing triggers its own initial partial fee and separate monthly 20% installments; no single 20% cap across all cases

Key Cases Cited

Chandler v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discusses PLRA amendments and prisoners’ filing-fee obligations)
Mitchell v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 587 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (imminent-danger exception assessed at time of filing; post-filing events not considered)
Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) (supports temporal focus on conditions at time complaint filed for §1915(g))
Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2010) (represents per-prisoner cap approach in circuit split over §1915(b) collection)
Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 1997) (represents per-case approach requiring separate installments per filing)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing framework and burden of proof for each element)
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (standing elements summarized)
Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394 (1976) (mandamus is extraordinary relief; high standard for issuance)
In re Kissi, 652 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (PLRA’s purpose to deter frivolous prisoner filings reiterated)