Jeremy Drouillard v. American Alternative Insurance Corporation, 929 N.W.2d 777

Ambulance insured under American Alternative policy struck drywall in roadway on Sept. 2014–Sept. 2015 policy period; drywall had fallen from an unidentified truck and was stationary at impact.
Plaintiff (Tri‑Hospital EMS) sought uninsured motorist (UM) benefits under the policy's hit‑and‑run provision, which covers a vehicle that "hits, or cause[s] an object to hit," a covered auto when driver/owner cannot be identified.
Trial court granted summary disposition for defendant; Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the stationary drywall did not "hit" the ambulance and thus no coverage as a matter of law.
Michigan Supreme Court granted review and reversed the Court of Appeals, concluding that depositing a load in the path of an oncoming vehicle can satisfy the policy phrase "cause an object to hit."
Case remanded to St. Clair Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an unidentified vehicle that loses a load which later lies stationary and is struck by the insured "cause[d] an object to hit" the insured vehicle under the policy	The truck caused the drywall to contact the ambulance by depositing it in the ambulance’s path; "cause an object to hit" covers this scenario	"Hit" requires the object itself to have struck the vehicle (i.e., be moving); stationary drywall did not "hit" the ambulance, so no coverage	Held for plaintiff: depositing drywall in path of oncoming vehicle can constitute causing an object to hit a covered auto; whether object was moving when contact occurred is not dispositive
Whether policy language is ambiguous and must be construed for insured	Ambiguity favors coverage; plain‑language reading supports coverage	Language unambiguous to mean a moving object must hit the vehicle; no coverage	Court found ordinary meaning ("come in contact with") supports coverage in these circumstances; resolved in favor of insured

DeFrain v. State Farm, 491 Mich. 359 (2012) (UM coverage is contractual; policy terms govern)
Twichel v. MIC Gen. Ins. Corp., 469 Mich. 524 (2004) (insurance contract interpretation reviewed de novo; undefined terms given ordinary meaning)
Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bronson Plating Co., 445 Mich. 558 (1994) (use dictionary to determine layperson meaning; construe ambiguities for insured)
Empire Iron Mining Partnership v. Orhanen, 455 Mich. 410 (1997) (identical language in same act should receive identical construction)
In re Erwin, 503 Mich. 1 (2018) (dictionary as a tool, not sole determinant, in construing ordinary meaning)
Henderson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 460 Mich. 348 (1999) (interpret contractual phrases as they convey to those familiar with contemporary usage)
People v. Harris, 499 Mich. 332 (2016) (corpus linguistics can assist in analyzing ordinary meaning)
Burkam v. Trowbridge, 9 Mich. 209 (1861) (contract terms interpreted by common sense and usage)