Jenny L Flores v. Edwin Meese, 2:85-cv-04544

Background

The 1997 Flores Settlement (consent decree) set national standards for detention, release, and care of immigrant minors and required a bond-redetermination hearing before an immigration judge for any minor in deportation/removal proceedings (Paragraph 24A).
After Flores, Congress enacted the Homeland Security Act (HSA, 2002) transferring responsibility for care and placement of unaccompanied alien children to HHS’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), and included a savings clause preserving preexisting agreements.
In 2008 Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), which assigned ORR responsibility for custody and placement of unaccompanied minors and incorporated the HSA savings clause; it also limited secure detention to children who pose danger or are charged with crimes.
The government argued that the HSA and TVPRA eliminated Paragraph 24A’s bond‑hearing requirement for unaccompanied minors; plaintiffs moved to enforce Paragraph 24A against ORR and other federal defendants.
The district court ordered enforcement; the government appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the HSA and TVPRA did not terminate Paragraph 24A as to unaccompanied minors.
The court emphasized that neither statute expressly repeals the bond‑hearing requirement, that statutory structure leaves room for immigration-judge review, and that preserving the hearings furthers congressional intent to protect vulnerable children.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether HSA/TVPRA terminated Paragraph 24A bond‑hearing requirement for unaccompanied minors	Flores: the Settlement remains binding; statutes did not repeal Paragraph 24A	Government: statutory reorganization and ORR authority displaced immigration‑judge bond hearings for unaccompanied minors	Held: No. HSA and TVPRA did not terminate Paragraph 24A for unaccompanied minors.
Whether silence in statutes constitutes implicit repeal of bond hearings	Flores: Congress’s silence does not repeal existing consent decree rights; savings clause preserves agreements	Government: lack of statutory mention shows Congress did not intend bond hearings for unaccompanied minors	Held: Silence is not an affirmative repeal; courts presume Congress does not silently abrogate existing law.
Whether HSA/TVPRA’s statutory framework gives ORR exclusive authority over detention/placement, precluding IJ review	Flores: statutes focus on care/placement, not adjudicatory detention authority; statutes require interagency coordination, leaving room for IJs to review custody	Government: ORR’s custody/placement responsibility leaves no room for immigration-judge bond redeterminations	Held: Statutory text and structure do not vest exclusive, autonomous control in ORR; IJs may conduct bond hearings.
Whether giving unaccompanied minors bond hearings conflicts with congressional intent to protect children	Flores: hearings advance the statutes’ protective purpose and provide procedural safeguards absent from ORR’s internal procedures	Government: bond hearings yield little practical benefit since ORR must still approve custodian and placements	Held: Providing hearings is consistent with congressional purpose and provides meaningful procedural protections; any diminished practical effect does not make hearings impermissible.

Key Cases Cited

Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2016) (prior Ninth Circuit decision interpreting Flores Settlement applicability)
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (standard for modifying consent decrees when law changes)
Sys. Fed. No. 91 Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (consent decrees should not be converted into instruments of wrong)
NLRB v. Plasterers’ Local No. 79, 404 U.S. 116 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (caution against inferring congressional intent from silence)
City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, 702 F.3d 1147 (8th Cir. 2013) (example of modifying consent decree when intervening law makes prior decree illegal)
Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2006) (presumption that Congress is aware of existing law when legislating)
In re Mark Anthony Const., Inc., 886 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir. 1989) (avoid inferring from congressional silence an intent to alter legal context)