Jeffrey Walton v. State of Tennessee, W2016-01395-CCA-R3-PC

Background

Walton was convicted of burglary of a building and vandalism over $10,000 for entering and damaging Barrow‑Agee Laboratories; jury returned guilty verdicts and trial court imposed an effective 27‑year sentence.
On direct appeal this court affirmed; Walton then filed a post‑conviction petition asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Walton alleged counsel (second and third trial attorneys) failed to: prepare a trial strategy, investigate Barrow‑Agee corporate identity/financial background (creating an indictment variance), effectively cross‑examine damage and owner witnesses, and request jury instructions on duress/necessity.
Trial testimony described clear physical evidence placing Walton inside the building (hole in wall/ceiling, K9 indication, eyewitness/security and police observations, and $23,654.74 repair estimate from an independent adjuster).
At the post‑conviction hearing, trial counsel testified about plea negotiations, trial preparation (strategy evolved from necessity/duress to blaming an unknown third party), and reasons for not pursuing certain lines of proof; the court found counsel credible and Walton not credible.
The post‑conviction court denied relief; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, finding Walton failed to show deficient performance or prejudice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Counsel failed to prepare a trial strategy	Walton: counsel had "no trial strategy" and were overburdened, impairing defense	Counsel: discussed strategy among themselves; strategy shifted based on Walton's changing accounts; advised plea was better	Held: No deficient performance; court credited counsel and strategy choices were reasonable
2. Failure to investigate corporate identity / fatal indictment variance	Walton: indictment named "Barrow‑Agee, Inc." which allegedly did not own property; variance was fatal and prejudicial	State/counsel: witnesses and records showed Barrow‑Agee (and related entities) were owners/identified the property; ownership not material element	Held: No material variance; naming was surplusage; Walton not prejudiced by counsel's investigation failure
3. Failure to cross‑examine owner/adjuster about damages and bias	Walton: counsel should have exposed owner Tenent’s corporate ties and pending civil suit to impeach damage estimate and motive to inflate	State/counsel: damages came from independent adjuster; corporate litigation evidence would have been irrelevant and excluded	Held: No prejudice shown; impeachment/financial background would likely be inadmissible or immaterial
4. Failure to request jury instructions on duress/necessity	Walton: duress/necessity instructions would give jury reasons to acquit or convict of lesser offenses	Counsel: explored those defenses but could not corroborate Walton’s inconsistent accounts; Walton later denied being under duress and claimed he never entered	Held: Defenses not fairly raised by the proof; counsel not deficient for withholding those instructions

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑part ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. 1997) (competence standard and deference to tactical decisions)
Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1996) (performance and prejudice framing under Tennessee law)
March v. State, 293 S.W.3d 576 (Tenn. Crim. App.) (variance/surplusage discussion re: ownership allegations)
Hill v. State, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997) (indictment sufficiency and notice to accused)
Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95 (Tenn. 1998) (statute citation in charge can supply adequate notice)
Moss v. State, 662 S.W.2d 590 (Tenn. 1984) (material variance doctrine)
Jaco v. State, 120 S.W.3d 828 (Tenn. 2003) (burden of proof in post‑conviction proceedings)
Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2001) (mixed questions of law and fact; deference to trial court credibility findings)
Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2015) (appellate review standards for post‑conviction findings)
Finch v. State, 226 S.W.3d 307 (Tenn. 2007) (no need to analyze both Strickland prongs if one fails)